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Preface
Individuals face a variety of financial incentives, which are valuable instruments to
allocate resources and to steer behavior. Governments use them in a variety of contexts
like, for instance, tobacco taxes or subsidies for new technologies. Another example is
the prospect of higher earnings due to higher education, which provides an important
incentive in our society to advance the long-term investments in education. Empirical
evaluations are an important way to assess the extent to which individuals react to
incentives.
This dissertation consists of four self-contained chapters. The first two chapters
analyze the 2004 health care reform in Germany. An important aim of the reform was
to strengthen cost consciousness and personal responsibility of the insured. The focus in
the first two chapters is on a particular element of the reform, namely a per-quarter fee
for doctor visits, and the question how this treatment affects individuals’ decisions to
visit a doctor. The time dimension of the fee implies that individuals sometimes do not
have to take the fee into account when making decisions. While the treatment status
is usually based on characteristics that can easily be observed (like age and gender),
in this case, it follows implicitly from the design of the treatment. In this application,
an individual’s treatment status actually depends on previous and future demand for
health care, and this complicates the evaluation of the fee. In the first chapter, I exploit
the fact that the treatment status depends on previous health care demand, to form
a unique identification strategy. In the second chapter Amelie Wuppermann and I
develop an econometric model which takes into account that the perceived treatment
status depends on future health care demand. The results suggest that certain groups
are ex-ante or ex-post unaffected by the fee. A narrower definition of the group that
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is actually affected makes it possible to reveal the true effect of the fee. The focus of
the last two chapters is on the enhancement of econometric methods. Examples from
health and labor economics are given for illustrative purposes.
In chapter 1, I use the German Socio-Economic Panel to estimate the effects of the
2004 health care reform. Among other things, the reform imposes a fee of e 10 for the
first visit to a doctor in each quarter of the year. Patients who have already paid the fee
are therefore exempt for the rest of the calendar quarter implying that the treatment
status depends on previous health care demand. Exploiting random variation of the
treatment level over different interview days, I find a substantial effect of the new
fee on the probability of visiting a physician. In addition, the identification strategy
makes it possible to disentangle this effect from the influences of the contemporaneous
increase of co-payments for prescription drugs. I verify the crucial assumptions of my
approach using a claims data set from the largest German sickness fund. Overall, the
probability of visiting a physician decreased by around 5 percentage points. Due to
my identification strategy, I can attribute at least half of this effect to the per-quarter
fee for doctor visits.
In chapter 2, Amelie Wuppermann and I revisit the analysis of the reform in spirit
of the literature about nonlinear price schedules. We provide empirical evidence of
heterogeneous reactions that are in line with theoretical considerations. Using insur-
ance claims data from the largest German sickness fund we find that some individuals
strongly react to the new price schedule while there is a group of individuals that does
not react at all. This is the group with the worst health in which some individuals
may know ex-ante that they cannot avoid the fee. Following van Kleef et al. (2009) we
suggest a further reform of the system that may help to also increase cost consciousness
among individuals in bad health while possibly even decreasing the financial burden
for these individuals.
In chapter 3, I extend the literature on hurdle models, which are frequently used to
model count data. Recent developments in the count data literature make it possible
to relax commonly imposed assumptions of these models. Based on these findings,
I develop two extensions of hurdle models which make popular specifications more
flexible. Both extensions nest the models that have been estimated previously and
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they can thus be tested by appropriate parametric restrictions. An example from
health economics illustrates the relevance of both model extensions.
In chapter 4, I employ the new variance estimator for generalized empirical
likelihood that has recently been proposed by Newey and Windmeijer (2009) to address
the problem that the usual variance estimator understates the true variance. In Monte
Carlo examples they show that t-statistics based on the new variance estimator have
nearly correct size. I replicate their Monte Carlo simulations and additionally report
results for a wider range of the simulation parameters. Moreover, my simulation re-
sults suggest that two-stage least squares estimates are poor starting values for the
continuous updating estimator, especially when the sample size is small and/or the
identification is weak. Finally, I use the continuous updating estimator to assess the
private returns to education using a well-known data set, and additionally report the
many weak instruments standard errors of Newey and Windmeijer (2009).
Chapter 1
Quarterly co-payments, demand for health care and
response behavior - Evidence from survey and claims
data
1.1 Introduction
Insurance firms try to implement incentives to avoid excessive claims. This is
particularly important in health insurance markets because some therapies depend
on patient choice. The first visit to a doctor for a new illness, for instance, is solely
a patient’s decision. Here co-payments could be an appropriate instrument to reduce
moral hazard. The introduction and increase of co-payments have been important in-
struments of past health care reforms in the German statutory health insurance. There
are, for instance, co-payments for drugs, hospitalization and doctor visits. These in-
struments have a direct fiscal effect because the insurer covers a lower amount. In
addition, there might be a reduction in the demand for health care services because
the insured avoid excessive use. Such an inhibiting effect on utilization was also a
professed goal of the co-payment for doctor visits which was introduced in Germany in
2004. This study exploits random variation in the day of the interview of a survey to
reveal the causal effect of the new fee. Accounting for the structure of the data, there
is a significant decline in the probability of visiting a doctor. To verify the essential
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assumptions of my approach, I imitate a survey with two randomly assigned interview
days using claims data from the “Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse” (AOK), which is the
largest sickness fund in Germany.
According to the OECD (2008), around 90% of the German population are covered
by statutory health insurance (SHI). The regulation of SHI is heavily influenced by
governmental decisions. One example is the implementation of a broad health care
reform in 2004 which tried to strengthen cost consciousness and personal responsibility
by increasing co-payments. An important part of this reform was the introduction of
co-payments for doctor visits. Since 2004, most SHI-insured adults have had to pay
e 10 for the first visit to a doctor in a calendar quarter. Children and teenagers up to
the age of 18 are exempt from co-payments. Moreover, there are also exemption rules
for adults. They can apply for an exemption by paying one or two percent of their
income in advance. Alternatively, they can choose a gate-keeping model. In this case
they often have to pay only e 10 a year but must visit a general practitioner (GP) first.
When more specialised care is required, the patients receive a referral from this GP.
The e 10 fee also covers additional doctor visits within a calendar quarter. So
it is a “per-quarter” fee, which is independent of the volume of services rendered in
connection with this or later visits within a quarter. This characteristic distinguishes
the co-payment from “per-visit” fees. The effects of a per-visit co-payment have been
analyzed in several studies (Roemer et al., 1975; Jung, 1998; van de Voorde et al.,
2001). For instance, Jung (1998) investigated the effects of implementing such a fee
in Korea. He found an remarkable decrease in the number of doctor visits and in the
probability of seeking medical care. The effects of a per-quarter co-payment, however,
should be different because this fee is not intended to affect all parts of the distribution.
It creates a new incentive to avoid the first visit to a doctor in a quarter. However, in
contrast to a per-visit fee, it generates no incentives to reduce the number of doctor
visits within a quarter once the fee is paid.
Additionally, co-payments for prescription drugs have been increased at the same
time as the introduction of the e 10 fee and this complicates the evaluation of the fee.
Prior to the reform, patients had to pay e 4 for small, e 4.50 for medium and e 5 for
large quantities of drugs. Since 2004 it has been a function of the retail price and the
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patient has had to bear 10% of the drug price. The co-payment amounts at least to
e 5 and at most to e 10. The effects of increasing co-payments for prescription drugs
on the demand for doctor visits were extensively investigated by Winkelmann (2004a,
2004b, 2006). He analyzed the influence of an earlier health care reform implemented
in 1997. The most radical element of this reform was the increase of co-payments for
prescription drugs (Winkelmann 2004a). All three studies found a link between the
propensity to visit a doctor and co-payments for prescription drugs. Therefore, the
health care reform of 2004 could affect the behavior of health care consumers through
both the increased prescription fees and the introduction of co-payments for doctor
visits. This study, however, introduces a method to disentangle these two effects and
to uncover the impact of the co-payment for doctor visits.
There are two studies dealing with the introduction of the e 10 fee. Both are based
on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Augurzky et al. (2006) tried to assess
the effect of the reform on the probability of seeing a physician using a differences-
in-differences approach. They compared statutory health insured participants with
privately insured persons, and youths, because the latter two groups are exempt from
the fee. Schreyögg and Grabka (2010) applied a similar estimation strategy. Further-
more, they used a zero-inflated negative binomial regression and a negative binomial
hurdle model to directly model the number of doctor visits. Both studies concluded
that the co-payment for doctor visits had failed to reduce the demand for doctor vis-
its and argued that this ineffectiveness stems from the fact that it is a per-quarter
fee. The present study, however, reveals that this characteristic does not make the fee
ineffective; rather, it is the reason why the effect cannot be observed in the GSOEP
using simple differences-in-differences approaches. In addition to a simple comparison
of physician visits over time between privately and statutorily insured individuals, this
study uses a second natural experiment that exploits exogenous variation in the day
of the interview. This allows me to disentangle the impact of the per-quarter fee from
the effects of other parts of the reform. Using this approach, I show that the reform
as a whole decreases the probability of visiting a physician by 5 percentage points.
The per-quarter fee causes at least half of this effect. To put things in perspective,
Winkelmann (2004a, 2004b, 2006) has already shown that an increase in prescription
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fees indirectly affects the demand for doctor visits, so it would come as a surprise if
fees for doctor visits had no direct effect on it.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the second natural
experiment which identifies the causal effect of the new fee. Section 3 explains the
data sets used in this analysis and the estimation strategies. Section 4 shows that the
co-payment alters the observable behavior in the survey data in a special manner. The
effect of the new fee can only be observed once the model accounts for the structure of
the data. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Identification strategy
The GSOEP is an annual survey started in 1984 which, among other things, includes
a question about the number of visits to a doctor in the last three months before the
interview.1 Thus the observed three-month period depends on the day of the interview.
The interviews are conducted every day from January to October. This variation can
be used to identify the causal effect of the new fee if, depending on the day of the
interview, the participants are differentially affected by the fee. As already mentioned,
a special characteristic of the fee is that it must only be paid at the first visit in a
quarter. This characteristic makes it possible to identify random samples of the SHI-
insured population that are differently affected by the per-quarter fee. The following
example is to show that the probability of having to pay the e 10 fee and thus the
treatment level depends on the day of the interview.
By way of illustration, Figure 1.1 shows the reporting period for an interview con-
ducted at August 15th. The reporting period can be separated into two equal periods
- one period before and one period after the end of the calendar quarter (p2 and p3
in Figure 1.1). Period 1, on the other hand, is the unobserved part of the previous
calendar quarter. Since period 3 starts at the beginning of a new calendar quarter, all
respondents are affected by the per-quarter fee in period 3. However, the treatment
status in period 2 is less clear cut because participants do not have to pay the fee in
1 The question reads as follows: Have you gone to a doctor within the last three months? If yes, please
state how often.
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Figure 1.1: Decomposition of the reporting period and degree of misclassification
according to the AOK sample
the second period if they have already paid it in the first period. According to the 2004
claims data set, 56% of the population had already paid the fee in period 1 (see also
Figure 1.1). Hence, a large fraction of the population was indeed unaffected by the
new fee in period 2 which was a part of the reporting period. Previous research results
(e. g. Schreyögg and Grabka, 2010) were, however, based on a clear-cut treatment
status. They assumed that all participants in the GSOEP were equally affected by the
reform independent of the day of the interview. Hence, there was a misclassification in
the treatment level, which generally leads to an attenuation bias (Aigner, 1973). This
explains why previous studies did not find significant effects. In the next paragraph I
explain the underlying problem more formally and provide a solution to overcome it.
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The probability of at least one doctor visit within the reporting period can easily
be obtained by
Pr(y > 0) = 1− Pr(y = 0)
= 1− Pr(s2 = 0, s3 = 0)
= 1− Pr(s2 = 0)Pr(s3 = 0)
= 1− [Pr(s1 = 0, s2 = 0) + Pr(s1 > 0, s2 = 0)]Pr(s3 = 0) (1.1)
where the number of doctor visits in period pk is sk for k = 1, 2, 3 and the number of
visits in the reporting period is y = s2 + s3. For illustration purposes, I assume that
the doctor visits follow a Poisson process. This justifies the third equality because all
periods are disjoint time intervals. The Law of Total Probability then gives the fourth
equality. It separates the individuals into two groups. Firstly, the group of individuals
that had not visited a doctor in the first period and therefore had to pay the fee in the
second period. Secondly, the group of individuals that had visited a doctor in the first
period and thus had access to free visits in the second period. Compared to the years
before the reform, the out-of-pocket costs during period 2 were unchanged in the latter
group. This is the variation in the treatment level that I want to exploit in this study.
Whenever the reporting period differs from a calendar quarter, like in a survey,
there is a misclassification of the treatment status in a simple before-after comparison in
which all observations are considered as treated after the reform. Actually, Pr(s1 > 0)
is the probability of a false-positive treatment status in the second period. Since the
reporting period consists of period 2 and 3, I can observe the true reform effect only
if Pr(s1 > 0) = 0. The group of participants who were interviewed at the end of a
calendar quarter is the only group where I know for sure that this condition is true. I
therefore hypothesize that the true reform effect and in particular the causal effect of the
per-quarter fee can only be observed in the group of participants who were interviewed
at the end of a calendar quarter. To get rid of the misclassification problem, I use
different models that account for the day of the interview. The details of these models
are explained in the next section.
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1.3 Data and estimation
I use two separate data sets to verify my identification strategy. The primary source
of data is the GSOEP, which is an annual survey started in 1984. The second data
source is a claims data set from the largest German sickness fund. I have used this
data set to imitate a survey with two randomly assigned interview days. This enables
me to verify essential assumptions of my identification strategy that are untestable
with survey data. In the following, I finalize my identification strategy and state my
hypotheses. Then, I explain how the claims data set can be used to investigate the
validity of the assumptions.
I created a data set using the GSOEP and a data set using claims data from the
AOK. I selected a period of four years centered around the health care reform of 2004
and used the years 2002/03 to observe the behavior before the reform and 2005/06 as
post-reform years.2 The sample includes men and women aged 20 to 60. The basic
estimation strategy is to pool the data over the four years and evaluate the effect of the
fee on the probability of at least one visit to a doctor in the observed three months.3
I use linear probability models (LPM) to determine the effect of the reform. The
conditional probability of at least one doctor visit is Pr(y > 0|xk,w) = x′kβk +w′γ
where y is the number of doctor visits. The index k refers to different parameterizations
of the linear index x′β which have been estimated to evaluate the effect of the reform.
They are explained in more detail in the following paragraph. The vector w stands
for other characteristics controlled for in the regressions. It contains a second-order
polynomial in age, two indicators for self-reported health status, three indicators for
interview season and employment status. Furthermore, I include the variables female,
years of education, married, household size, welfare recipient and household income.4
The LPM have been estimated using different parameterizations. One current
2 The year 2004 has to be ignored because many interviews in the GSOEP take place in the first three
months and thus the observed three-month period lies partly in the pre- and post-reform time.
3 Generally, it is possible to analyze the effect on the number of visits using a count data model. In this
study, however, I am primarily interested in the binary decision whether an individual visits a doctor
or not because not visiting a doctor is the only way to avoid the fee.
4 In the claims data set I can observe only individuals’ age and gender.
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method to evaluate health care reforms in Germany is to compare privately and statuto-
rily insured persons with a differences-in-differences approach because privately insured
persons are unaffected by these changes. Under the assumption of a common trend
between privately and statutorily insured persons, this approach can identify the effect
of the entire reform only if this effect is independent of when the interview took place.
Here x′kβk is
x′1β1 = β1,1after + β1,2SHI + β1,3after * SHI (1.2)
where the variable after indicates the post-reform years and the variable SHI is an
indicator of whether a person is SHI-insured. The interaction between after and SHI
denotes a statutorily insured observation after the reform.
As hypothesized in section 1.2, SHI-insured participants in the GSOEP are, depend-
ing on the day of their interview, differently affected by the new fee. The estimation
strategy in equation (1.2), which has also been used in previous studies, ignores the
variation of the day of the interview which may lead to a misclassification of the treat-
ment status. The models discussed in the following use the information about the day
of the interview to assess the reform effect and in particular the causal effect of the
per-quarter fee:
x′2β2 = β2,1after + β2,2SHI + β2,3after * SHI * q + β2,4after * SHI * (1-q) (1.3)
where q measures the degree of misclassification which rises with decreasing overlap
between reporting period and calendar quarter. I use a dichotomous and a continuous
measure of the misclassification. In the latter case q is the distance of the day of the
interview to the nearest end of a calendar quarter and q = 0 indicates individuals
who were interviewed at the end of a quarter where the misclassification is zero. β2,4
therefore reveals the true reform effect. The assumption that the reform effect is
independent of the day of the interview can be rejected once β2,4 is significantly different
from β2,3. Additionally, it is possible to identify the reform effect by a dichotomous
variable that splits the participants into two groups - similar to the example discussed
in section 1.2. In group A the interview took place at the end of a quarter (plus or minus
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10 days).5 Group B contains the remaining sample.6 The results from the dichotomous
measure are very similar to the results from the continuous measure, indicating that
the misclassification in group A is close to zero. I therefore rely on the dichotomous
measure in the following analysis.
The final estimation strategy makes it possible to disentangle the influence of the
per-quarter fee from the effect of the contemporaneous increase of co-payments for
drugs. This is because group A and B are equally affected by the increase in prescription
fees but they are differently exposed to the new fee for doctor visits. The difference
between both groups is caused by some members of group B who had access to free
visits in the second period but who would have been induced to participate completely
if they had been interviewed at the end of a calendar quarter. The probability of having
to pay the fee is thus different between both groups and if the fee works, this will affect
each group’s demand for medical care differently. Here the analysis is very similar to
the estimation of a local average treatment effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Using
only SHI-insured observations, the different trends can be estimated by
x′3β3 = β3,1after + β3,2A + β3,3after *A (1.4)
where β3,2 is expected to be zero since both groups are untreated before the reform.
The parameter β3,3 identifies the post-reform difference between both groups, which
is caused by the lower treatment level in group B. Furthermore, β3,3 should be larger
in magnitude in the sicker population because they visit a doctor on average more
often than healthy people. Hence, more of them have access to free visits and the
misclassification of the treatment status in the second period is higher, implying that
5 The group A indicator must contain some days around the end of a calendar quarter since too few
participants were interviewed exactly at the end of a quarter.
6 Schreyögg and Grabka (2010) apply a similar approach but do not use the variation of the day of the
interview to identify the causal effect of the new fee. They restrict their sample to those respondents
who gave their interview within 15 days before the end of a quarter. This classification, however,
incorrectly assigns persons to their group B that were interviewed close to the end of a calendar
quarter where the misclassification is close to zero - namely, those participants who were interviewed
at the beginning of a calendar quarter. This classification, thus, decreases the exogenous variation in
the degree of misclassification and it is not surprising that they only found slightly larger effects for
their group A.
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a larger fraction of individuals contributes to the identification.
There are two essential assumptions of my identification strategy. The first one
is that the distance to the end of a calendar quarter was assigned to each survey
participant in a way that can be considered as random. The evidence in the GSOEP
data strongly suggests a random assignment. Nevertheless, I additionally verify this
assumption using the claims data set. Here I can randomly split the sample to simulate
certain interview or reporting periods and compare the results of equation (1.4) with the
corresponding results from the GSOEP. The first “interview period” starts on July 1st
and ends on September 30th of each year, i.e. it covers a full calendar quarter. This is
group A in the claims data set. The “interview period” of group B is from May 16th to
August 15th of each year. I used the claims data set to calculate the number of doctor
visits in both “interview periods”. The second key assumption is that the probability
of visiting a doctor in the different interview periods would have been the same in the
absence of the new fee. Here seasonal fluctuations are a potential concern since both
“interview periods” are not completely overlapping. I used the 16 to 17 year olds to
investigate this assumption. Given a common trend, this group makes it possible to
separate seasonal effects, since people younger than 18 do not have to co-pay at all.
Hence, in the absence of seasonal effects there should be no difference between both
“interview periods” in the group of 16 to 17 year olds. The random assignment and
the absence of seasonal effects would suggest that there are also no differences between
both “interview periods” in the adult population – apart from the variation in the
probability of having to pay the fee.
1.4 Results
Table 1.1 shows that the per-quarter fee alters the observable behavior of the
SHI-insured persons in the GSOEP in a special manner. It displays the sample means
for the years before and after the reform grouped by whether or not the respondents
were interviewed at the end of a quarter. Interestingly, after the reform the share
of respondents with at least one doctor visit is significantly lower when participants
were interviewed at the end of a quarter (group A) compared to the second group of
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interviews which took place sometime in the middle of a quarter (group B). This is,
however, not the case before the reform. In both groups 64% visit their doctor at
least once in three months before the reform. The unconditional probability decreases
to 61.6% in group A after the reform, whereas it stays unchanged at around 64% in
group B. Apart from the stronger decline in group B, the results are very similar in the
claims data set from the AOK Hesse. Here I can also see a difference between group
A and B after the reform but no difference before the reform.
Table 1.1 also gives evidence that the distance to the end of a calendar quarter is
quasi-randomly assigned. There are namely no significant differences between group A
and B in important predictors of need for medical care. For instance, the average age
in the GSOEP is 40 in both groups and around 54% of the respondents are female.
Self-reported health (SRHS) is also very similar in both groups. In contrast to the
AOK Hesse data set, the assignment to both groups was not by definition random in
the GSOEP. Therefore it is here particularly important to see that there is neither a dif-
ference in the outcome before the reform nor any differences in important explanatory
variables.
In this paragraph I verify my identification strategy using the claims data set.
Table 1.2 compares and contrasts the estimation results from the GSEOP data with the
results from the AOK claims data. The corresponding estimation strategy is described
in equation (1.4). The first two columns are based on the survey data, the third
column shows the corresponding results from the claims data set and the last column
shows the results for the 16 to 17 year olds which allows me to separate potential
seasonal effects. There are some differences between the survey data and the claims
data set. Firstly, while I can observe many potential covariates in the survey, I only
observe individuals’ age and gender in the claims data set. For comparison reasons,
the covariates in Table 1.2 are thus restricted to a second-order polynomial in age and
a gender indicator. Secondly, while the individuals in the claims data set are insured
with AOK, the survey participants can be insured in all existing statutory sickness
funds. This is particularly important because if someone is SHI-insured, he can choose
between all statutory sickness funds. As a result, the risk pool of AOK may differ
from the other sickness funds. According to official figures, AOK insurees are slightly
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Table 1.1: Group means before and after the reform
GSOEP AOK Hesse
2002 & 2003 2005 & 2006 2002 & 2003 2005 & 2006
At least one doctor visit 0.640 0.616 0.658 0.581
0.640 0.642 0.659 0.610
Age 39.77 40.36 40.62 40.86
39.94 40.65 40.69 40.96
Female 0.532 0.548 0.471 0.480
0.534 0.543 0.477 0.485
SRHS (1: very good, ..., 5: very bad) 2.475 2.529
2.495 2.525
Education in years 11.75 12.01
11.82 11.90
Married 0.626 0.616
0.620 0.594
Household size 3.063 3.024
3.035 2.955
Welfare recipient 0.037 0.053
0.038 0.069
Ln(income) 7.719 7.767
7.695 7.695
Observations 3,680 3,430 152,086 147,923
19,664 16,770 152,091 147,563
Only SHI-insured observations are used in the GSOEP sample (Group A / Group B).
Note: The lower fraction of women in the AOK Hesse sample is in accordance with official figures. See e.g.
“GKV-Versicherte nach Alter und Wohnort GKV-Statistik KM6 zum 1. Juli 2005”, Federal Ministry of Health.
older than the entire population.7 Therefore I also provide the estimation results for
the group of survey participants who are insured with AOK (see column 2). Finally,
there is a regional difference. While all individuals in the claims data set live in Hesse,
the GSEOP is a German-wide survey. However, I do not believe that this affects
the comparability of both samples since Hesse is a large federal state and certainly
representative of Germany.
The results are striking. Although I randomly split the claims data set into two
groups, there is a significant difference in the probability of visiting a physician be-
tween these two groups after the reform which was not the case before the reform (see
column 3 of Table 1.2). On the other hand, splitting the 16 to 17 year olds into two
groups with different “interview periods” does not lead to a significant difference (see
column 4), indicating that the effect on the adult population is not due to seasonal
7 Source, available only in German: "GKV-Versicherte nach Alter und Wohnort GKV-Statistik KM6
zum 1. Juli 2005", Federal Ministry of Health.
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Table 1.2: Estimation results from the different data sets
GSOEP GSOEP AOK Hesse
AOK only 20-60 16-17
Age/10 -0.0861 -0.0475 -0.1473 0.3875
(0.0185) (0.0326) (0.0051) (0.0542)
Age2/100 0.0161 0.0135 0.0234
(0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0000)
Female 0.1495 0.1583 0.1719 0.1654
(0.0058) (0.0102) (0.0016) (0.0061)
After -0.0024 -0.0064 -0.0523 -0.0130
(0.0047) (0.0085) (0.0016) (0.0086)
A 0.0015 0.0143 0.0011 -0.0105
(0.0085) (0.0147) (0.0020) (0.0088)
After x A -0.0260 -0.0382 -0.0279 -0.0076
(0.0123) (0.0217) (0.0023) (0.0122)
Observations 43,544 13,760 599,663 27,763
Dependent variable: at least one doctor visit. Parameter estimates
after separate linear regressions using only SHI-insured observations.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
fluctuations. While the post-reform difference in the adult population is significant,
the pre-reform difference between both groups is not. This is the expected result when
the group assignment is random and when there are no seasonal differences between
both “interview periods” in the years before the reform. Given the random assignment
in the claims data set and the likely absence of seasonal influences, I therefore conclude
that the post-reform difference stems from the variation in the probability of having
to pay the new fee as hypothesized in section 1.2.
These results are very similar in the survey data set indicating that my identification
strategy also works in the GSOEP. But while the decline in group B, which can be
interpreted as the general effect of the reform, is about 5.2% in the claims data set, it
is insignificant in the survey data set. Given the accuracy of the claims data set, this
may point to a survey effect in the response behavior of the participants. The estimates
from the differences-in-differences regression, which are discussed in more detail later
in this study, strengthen this suggestion. They reveal an overall effect of 4.2-5.4% in
the GSOEP sample (see Table 1.3). This is distinctly larger than the overall effect of
2.8% in the GSOEP sample reported in Table 1.2, and also closer to the overall effect
of 8.0% in the AOK sample. The following part of the results is based on the GSOEP
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Table 1.3: Estimation results from the GSOEP data set
full sample if A = 1
Age / 10 -0.0982 -0.0984 -0.0981 -0.0529
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0392)
Age2/100 0.0123 0.0123 0.0123 0.0073
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0047)
Female 0.1350 0.1351 0.1350 0.1413
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0120)
Education / 10 0.0791 0.0795 0.0792 0.0910
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0230)
Married 0.0293 0.0292 0.0293 0.0311
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0141)
Household size -0.0247 -0.0247 -0.0248 -0.0232
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0052)
Good health -0.1691 -0.1693 -0.1692 -0.1780
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0121)
Bad health 0.1629 0.1628 0.1628 0.1520
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0144)
Welfare recipient -0.0114 -0.0117 -0.0116 -0.0282
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0340)
Ln(income) 0.0375 0.0376 0.0377 0.0313
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0129)
After 0.0146 0.0135 0.0141 0.0128
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0296)
SHI 0.0312 0.0316 0.0314 0.0474
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0238)
After x SHI -0.0226 -0.0537
(0.0125) (0.0314)
q is continuous dichotomous
After x SHI x q -0.0082∗ -0.0184∗
(0.0136) (0.0126)
After x SHI x (1-q) -0.0417∗ -0.0430∗
(0.0143) (0.0146)
Observations 49,326 49,326 49,326 8,084
Dependent variable: at least one doctor visit in the reporting period.
Models also account for seasonal effects and employment status.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ The parameter estimates are significantly different at the 1%-level.
data because in this data set I can take advantage of the richer set of covariates and
moreover can observe the privately insured as an additional contemporaneous control
group.
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Table 1.3 displays the average marginal effects of the probit regressions that com-
pare privately and statutorily insured individuals. Most effects are very similar to those
found in Winkelmann (2004a). The probability of visiting a doctor is u-shaped in age
and women are more likely to see a physician than men. The effects of education and
household size are larger in the present study and married persons are somewhat more
likely to visit a physician in Winkelmann’s sample. The estimation strategy in the first
column is a simple differences-in-differences approach conditional on covariates (see
equation (1.2)). According to these estimates, the reform leads to a slight decrease in
the probability of visiting a physician in the group of SHI-insured persons. It is only
weakly significant at the 10%-level despite the large sample size. This result is in line
with previous research which concluded that the per-quarter fee had failed to reduce
the demand for doctor visits (Augurzky et al., 2006; Schreyögg and Grabka, 2010).
However, this conclusion changes once the reform effect can vary with the degree of
misclassification as in equation (1.3) (compare columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.3). Now,
there is a strong and highly significant reform effect in both models given the misclassi-
fication is close to zero, i.e. q = 0. Figure 1.2 displays the reform effect over the entire
Figure 1.2: Average marginal effects for each day of the interview (GSOEP)
Co-payments, demand for health care and response behavior 19
range of q. The average marginal effect of the reform is significantly stronger at the
end of a calendar quarter, while I wrongly assume that the reform effect is constant in
the simple differences-in-differences regression in equation (1.2). Comparing the reform
effect at the end of a calendar quarter with the effect in the middle of a quarter, allows
me to assess the effect of the per-quarter fee. According to Figure 1.2, at least half
of the reform effect is caused by the per-quarter co-payment for doctor visits. The
underlying estimates are significantly different at the 1%-level (see Table 1.3).
The model in the first column of Table 1.3 is inappropriate to evaluate the new
co-payment for doctor visits. It assumes that the reform effect is independent of when
the interview took place although GSEOP participants are differently affected by the
new fee. Column 4 shows the estimation results for the group of participants who
were interviewed around the end of a quarter. The misclassification is almost zero in
this group. Here there is a significantly stronger decline in the probability of visiting
a physician in the group of statutorily health insured individuals than in the group
of privately insured. The average reform effect is -0.054 which is very similar to the
results from the second and third column (-0.042 and -0.043). The reform effect in
column 4 is, however, less significant, which is probably due to the distinctly smaller
sample size.
An important result of this study is that the true reform effect can only be found if
the reporting period is a full calendar quarter. Table 1.4 reports the estimation results
for equation (1.4) which compares the different trends between participants interviewed
around the end of a calendar quarter with the remaining sample. The estimation
strategy in Table 1.4 is the same as in Table 1.2 but in the former table I only use the
GSOEP data set and can thus take advantage of the richer set of covariates. According
to the last row of Table 1.4, there is a significantly stronger decline in the probability
of visiting a doctor in group A than in group B, similar to the results in Table 1.2.
The post-reform difference between group A and B should be larger in the group of
sick people, because they are more likely to visit a doctor in the unobserved period
than healthy people. Thus, a larger fraction of them has had access to free visits and
contributes to the identification. The upper panel in Table 1.4 shows the estimation
results of equation (1.4) and the sample means of the outcome variable grouped by
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Table 1.4: Comparison of trends for different subgroups of the population (GSOEP)
Pre-reform
Regressions Parameter estimates Number of Probability
conditional on SRHS After A After x A doctor visits of any use Obs.
very good 0.0277 0.0009 0.0239 0.99 0.43 4,075
(0.0169) (0.0289) (0.0429)
good -0.0018 0.0013 -0.0392 1.35 0.56 20,138
(0.0076) (0.0129) (0.0186)
satisfactory -0.0156 0.0156 -0.0253 2.49 0.72 13,525
(0.0084) (0.0152) (0.0210)
poor -0.0021 0.0341 -0.0675 5.02 0.88 4,769
(0.0112) (0.0179) (0.0275)
bad 0.0122 -0.0014 -0.0717 9.35 0.94 1,030
(0.0171) (0.0295) (0.0466)
Entire sample -0.0028 0.0084 -0.0314 2.24 0.64 43,544
(0.0047) (0.0085) (0.0120)
Dependent variable: at least one doctor visit in the reporting period.
Parameter estimates after separate linear regressions using only SHI-insured observations.
Covariates are the same as in Table 1.3. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
self-reported health status. The rise in the probability of visiting a doctor at least once
and in the number of doctor visits indicate that the group of individuals with access
to free visits increases with decreasing health status. As expected, the point estimate
for the post-reform difference between group A and B is largest in the sick population.
However, it is not significant (p-value=0.124) which might be caused by the distinctly
smaller sample size. Apart from the group which reports a satisfactory health status,
the point estimate rises in magnitude with decreasing health status. This indicates
that the sicker population contributes more to the identification, which might be due
to a true reduction in demand for medical care. However, since sick people have a
high need for medical care, it is unrealistic that they permanently reduce their visits
to zero in order to avoid paying e 10 per quarter. The difference between both groups
in the sicker population may therefore also be caused by a second effect of the fee. It
may have generated an incentive to cluster a given level of care in as few as possible
calendar quarters. So once people have access to free visits, they may be tempted to
group their visits into this quarter. This would affect the observable behavior in group
B stronger because some members of group B are exempt from the fee already at the
beginning of their reporting period. The post-reform difference between both groups
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could therefore also be caused by an incentive to cluster visits. Such a behavior would
also lead to a larger variance in the number of doctor visits. In the claims data set
there is indeed an increase in the variance after the reform. While the sample variance
was 26.7 before the reform, it rises to 30.5 after the reform. I will investigate this issue
in more detail in a follow-up analysis.
1.5 Conclusion
This study exploits exogenous variation in the day of the interview to assess the effect of
a per-quarter fee for doctor visits on utilization. This approach is appealing because it
compares random samples of the SHI-insured population that are differentially affected
by the new fee. Therefore, a differences-in-differences regression makes it possible to
disentangle its influence from potential macro effects. In particular, it separates the
influence of the fee from the effect of the contemporaneous increase of co-payments for
drugs.
The key contribution of this study is to show the necessity of comparing full quarters
before and after the reform to assess the effect of the 2004 health care reform. Otherwise
the treatment status is not clear-cut since some statutorily insured individuals have
had access to free visits after the reform. Ignoring this leads to an underestimation of
the reform effect due to a misclassification of the treatment status. The attenuation
bias increases with decreasing overlap between reporting period and calendar quarter.
The majority of participants in the GSOEP, however, has not been interviewed at the
end of a calendar quarter and their treatment status is thus subject to misclassification.
The true effect of the fee is therefore diluted in a simple before-after comparison.
The present study overcomes this problem by accounting for the misclassification.
The probability of visiting a physician is significantly influenced by the health care
reform of 2004. It decreased by around 5 percentage points. Due to my identification
strategy, I can attribute at least half of this effect to the per-quarter fee for doctor
visits.
Chapter 2
Heterogeneous effects of a nonlinear price schedule
for outpatient care†
2.1 Introduction
Nonlinear price schedules are a common feature of many health insurance systems.
Nonlinearities often arise due to deductibles or combinations of co-payments and
maximum out-of-pocket amounts. In order to increase cost consciousness the insured
have to bear part of their health care costs. But once the sum of out-of-pocket expen-
ditures exceeds a certain amount, co-payments for further health care use decrease or
even drop to zero. Economic theory predicts that not all insured react to co-payments
in the same way if the latter are combined with maximum out-of-pocket amounts.
Instead, individuals’ price sensitivity is predicted to depend on expected future health
care use, which naturally varies between individuals. For example, in a price schedule
where costs drop to zero once out-of-pocket expenditures exceed a certain amount,
individuals who expect that their out-of-pocket expenditures will exceed the maximum
amount have little incentive to reduce care today. They will likely have to pay the
same overall amount independent of their health care use today (Keeler et al., 1977;
Ellis, 1986).
† This chapter is joint work with Amelie Wuppermann. Peter Ihle, Ingrid Schubert and Joachim Winter
also participate in the project but are not co-authors of this chapter.
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In this study, we provide an empirical example for these theoretical considerations.
One of the challenges in this type of analysis is that individuals’ expectations on future
health care use are unobserved. In earlier studies this problem has been solved by pre-
dicting the missing information based on observable characteristics or prior health care
use (see Ellis, 1986; Contoyannis et al., 2005; Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas, 2010). In this
study, we present results that are in line with the theoretical predictions without con-
structing expectations. Instead, we allow for heterogeneous effects of the introduction
of a nonlinear price schedule in a finite mixture model. In this model, we can estimate
reactions for different classes of individuals without having to specify a priori which
individual belongs to which class. We thus do not need to observe expected health care
use a priori.
For our analysis, we use exogenous variation in the price schedule introduced by a
recent reform of the German statutory health insurance system. The statutory health
insurance is the public health insurance system in Germany that is mandatory for most
employees and covers around 90% of the German population. In 2004, a nonlinear
price schedule for doctor visits was introduced in this system. Before 2004 the publicly
insured did not have to co-pay for doctor visits. Since 2004, they have to pay a fee
of e 10 for the first visit to a doctor in each calendar quarter. Additional visits in
the same quarter are free of charge. The consumer price thus drops from e 10 to e 0
after the first doctor visit in a quarter. This per-quarter fee should mainly affect the
decision of a first visit in a quarter, because it is the first visit that determines whether
the fee has to be paid. Additional visits within one quarter do not change the overall
costs.1 We therefore focus on the question whether the reform affected the probability
of at least one visit in a quarter. We call this access to outpatient care.
Due to the nonlinearity in the price for doctor visits introduced by this reform, we
expect that whether individuals change their behavior following the reform depends
on individuals’ expectations of health care use which in turn depend on their health
status. For individuals who expect that they will likely have to visit a doctor within the
next three months, access to outpatient care might not change. Healthy individuals,
1 Of course, individuals could try to fit as many visits as possible into one quarter once the first visit
has taken place in order to avoid paying the fee in later quarters. We focus on this possible heaping
of visits in a follow-up analysis.
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however, might expect that they can avoid paying the fee and the probability of no
doctor visits might increase.
The literature that focuses on the effect of the specific reform of the German statu-
tory health insurance delivers mixed results. Augurzky et al. (2006) and Schreyögg and
Grabka (2010) find that the reform had essentially no effect on the health care use of
the statutorily insured in the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Using the same
data set Farbmacher (2009), on the contrary, presents evidence according to which the
statutorily insured on average reduced their propensity to visit a doctor. Farbmacher’s
results are in line with Rückert et al. (2008) who find that individuals surveyed in the
Bertelsmann Healthcare Monitor report avoiding and delaying doctor visits. We add
to this literature in two ways. First, we use a new data set for our analysis. Our data
is based on health insurance claims from the largest German sickness fund. The main
advantage compared to survey data is that we reliably observe doctor visits. Second,
we are the first to take into account that the newly introduced per-quarter fee has
an implicit deductible structure. We therefore focus on heterogeneous effects in our
analysis.
Our results indicate that the average probability of no doctor visit significantly
increases after the reform by about 4 percentage points. This result is in line with
Rückert et al. (2008) and Farbmacher (2009) and indicates that the reform affected
access to health care on average. Furthermore, we find evidence for heterogeneous
effects that are in line with the theoretical considerations by Keeler et al. (1977): The
results of our finite mixture model indicate that for about 36% of individuals access
to outpatient care is not changed by the reform. Among the remaining individuals, on
the contrary, access decreases significantly after the reform. Post-estimation analyses
further indicate that the individuals who do not react to the reform are sicker than the
others. They might not react to the new co-payment because they expect that they
cannot avoid paying the fee due to their health status, i.e. they assume to have at least
one visit in a quarter anyway.
While our results indicate that the per-quarter fee is successful in influencing the
healthier individuals’ behavior, sicker individuals do not react to the fee. Following an
idea proposed by van Kleef et al. (2009), we suggest to change the timing of the fee for
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sick individuals: Instead of a fee that is due for the first visit in a quarter, which sick
individuals cannot avoid due to their health status, individuals should get a certain
number of free visits before the fee applies. The number of free visits should ideally be
individual specific and depend on the unavoidable number of visits. As this is difficult
to reliably observe, characteristics that are not easily influenced by an individual, such
as age and sex, could serve as criteria. Our analysis suggest that women up to the age
of 50 should for example get one visit for free, while men in the same age group should
continue to pay at the first visit.
This chapter is structured as follows: The next section describes the health care
reform in more detail. Section 3 introduces the data set and Section 4 explains our
estimation strategy. In Section 5 the results are presented. Section 6 contains a dis-
cussion of the results and Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Incentive effects of the reform
The health care reform that we analyze became effective at the beginning of the year
2004. With this reform various financial incentives have been implemented in the
German statutory health insurance with the intend to increase patients’ cost con-
sciousness which may help to reduce moral hazard. The most radical element of the
reform has been the introduction of a per-quarter fee for doctor visits. While patients
did not have to co-pay for doctor visits before the reform, they have to pay e 10 for the
first visit to a physician in each quarter of the year since the reform in 2004. Further
doctor visits to the same doctor within this quarter are free of charge. Visits in the
same quarter to other doctors are also exempt from the fee if the patient gets a referral
by the doctor whom he visited at first. Alternatively, patients can visit other doctors
without referral and pay the fee again.
Additional parts of the reform have been an increase in prescription fees and the
abolishment of the possibility to prescribe over the counter medications. Since 2004
the patients have to copay at least e 5 and at most e 10 for their drugs - depending
on the drug price. The pre-reform prescription fees were between e 4 and e 5. Thus
in the best case there has been no increase in prescription fees while the increase in
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fees could have been up to 150% in the worst case. Furthermore, the sickness funds no
longer pay for eyeglasses and visual aids. Figure 2.1 shows the changes in Germany’s
consumer price index for medical care. The reform has permanently increased the
prices for medical care. According to this index, it has been the largest health care
reform in Germany for more than a decade.
 
Figure 2.1: Germany’s consumer price index for medical care
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, own visualization
The per-quarter fee for doctor visits was the central element of the reform and
attracted a lot of attention in the media. We are mainly interested in its effect on
the probability of visiting a physician. As paying the fee can only be avoided by not
visiting any physician within a quarter, it should mainly affect access to outpatient
care where access is measured as the probability of at least one visit to any type of
physician.
The per-quarter fee has introduced a nonlinearity in the price schedule. The reason
for this is its implicit deductible. It has to be paid only at the first visit in a calendar
quarter. Hence, given a referral the patient’s price for doctor visits drops to zero after
the first visit. This nonlinearity generates varying incentives depending on the individ-
ual’s health status. Keeler et al. (1977), for instance, show that under uncertainty a
rational individual facing a deductible will not base decisions on nominal prices. The
authors instead argue that “the greater the chance that future expenditures will exceed
the deductible, the cheaper today’s visit to the doctor”. A rational individual will thus
anticipate that the price drops to zero at a certain consumption level. In the German
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case the intertemporal effect on prices is relatively easy to assess because it only de-
pends on individuals’ knowledge about their probability of visiting a physician in the
next three months. In the extreme case their behavior is unaffected by the per-quarter
fee once they know that they have to visit a doctor in a certain calendar quarter (e. g.
to get a new prescription of a medicine for a chronic disease). The effective price for
doctor visits is thus lower for individuals with chronic conditions. Hence, if demand
for outpatient care depends on effective prices, we expect a weaker decrease in demand
for individuals with high risks of doctor visits than among low risk individuals. In this
argument we assume that individuals still visit doctors in case of major conditions and
take medically indicated drugs (e.g. to treat chronic diseases) despite the increase in
co-payments. This assumption can be justified by the low co-payment level. Generally,
individuals in Germany will not get into severe financial troubles due to out-of-pocket
expenditures.
2.3 Data
The analysis is based on insurance claims data from the largest German sickness fund in
the years 2002 to 2005. The data contains information on a 18.75% random subsample
of all individuals in the German state of Hesse who are insured with this sickness fund.
At the beginning of each year a sample refreshment is taken in order to keep the sample
representative for the insured population.2
The data contains information on doctor visits, the type of doctor visited, diagnoses
made at each visit measured in ICD-10 codes and prescribed medications. As we are
interested in the reactions to the introduction of the per-quarter fee, which can only be
avoided by not visiting any physician within a quarter, we aggregate the information
in the claims data to the quarterly level. Furthermore, we group information on the
different doctor visits into visits to general practitioners (GPs) and visits to specialists.
The data then contains information on the number of GP visits per quarter and the
number of specialist visits per quarter for each individual.
2 See http://www.pmvforschungsgruppe.de/content/02_forschung/02_b_sekundaerd_1.htm for a short
description of the data in German.
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The main advantage of using claims data compared to survey data is that doctor
visits are reliably observed. However, the only information on individuals’ health that
is contained in the data comes from the diagnosis codes and prescription drugs. This
information is only available for individuals who have seen a doctor. Independent of
doctor visits only information on age and sex is available. A disadvantage of the data is
thus that it only contains few observables that do not depend on whether an individual
has visited a doctor.
An additional drawback is that the data set consists only of publicly insured in-
dividuals and therefore includes no adults for whom nothing has changed due to the
reform and who could thus serve as a control group in our analysis. Only individuals
younger than 18 are generally exempt from paying the per-quarter fee. They, however,
may not be suitable as a control group for the entire adult population.3 We thus revert
to before-after comparisons to identify the effects of the reform in the adult popula-
tion. Our results therefore rely on the assumption that in the absence of the reform
no changes in health care use would have occurred or that if there were changes they
were not considerably large.
Our sample is further restricted to all individual-quarter pairs for which we observe
the use of outpatient services within the entire quarter. Individual-quarter pairs are
excluded, for example, if the individual switches from or to a different insurer within
the quarter. This ensures that the length of the period at risk is the same for each
observation.
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics for the third quarter of each year.4 The average
age is almost unchanged over time reflecting the conducted refreshments of the sample.
The average number of doctor visits in our sample is around 4.5 per quarter. On average
individuals visit a GP a little less than once a month and a specialist 1.7 times per
quarter. This in international comparison relatively high use of physician services is in
line with information from other data on doctor visits in Germany (see Grobe et al.,
2010).
While the average number of doctor visits per quarter does not show a clear change
3 This feature of the reform suggests a natural division in treatment and control group among teenagers.
We conduct a difference-in-difference analysis for teenagers in a follow-up study.
4 The descriptive statistics are very similar for all quarters of the year.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
3Q 2002 3Q 2003 3Q 2004 3Q 2005
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 51.87 18.71 52.16 18.75 52.31 18.81 52.17 18.88
19-39 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.46 0.29 0.46
40-59 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47
60-79 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46
≥ 80 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
Female 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50
# GP visits 2.77 4.12 2.75 4.11 2.77 4.16 2.85 4.33
GP>0 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.60 0.49 0.59 0.49
# GP visits truncated at 0 4.43 4.45 4.40 4.45 4.65 4.51 4.83 4.72
# Specialist visits 1.75 3.65 1.70 3.49 1.63 3.57 1.71 3.73
Specialist>0 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49
# Specialist visits truncated at 0 3.83 4.60 3.70 4.37 3.89 4.64 4.05 4.85
GP= 0 & Specialist = 0 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47
N 256,071 249,851 246,379 248,328
after the reform, two possible effects of the increased co-payments become evident in
Table 2.1. Between 2003 and 2004, the fraction of individuals with at least one GP
visit and the fraction with at least one specialist visit in the third quarter both decline,
from 63% to 60% for GPs and from 46% to 42% for specialists. Individuals thus seem
to avoid to contact either type of doctor after the reform.
As the co-payment can only be avoided by seeing neither type of physician, we
are particularly interested in how the probability of no doctor visit within a quarter
changed after the reform. Information on this is contained at the bottom of Table 2.1.
While in the third quarter of 2002 and 2003, roughly 27% of the sample visit neither
a GP nor a specialist, this is the case for 33% of individuals in the years after the
reform. The average probability of no doctor visit per quarter thus increases by about
6 percentage points after the reform.
The change in the probability of no doctor visit in 2004 compared to 2003 is also
depicted in Figure 2.2. This figure shows the changes in the third quarter of 2004
compared to 2003 separately for men and women in different age groups and in different
health status. The health status is captured by the Charlson Index (Charlson et al.,
1987). This index is based on 17 diseases identified from the diagnosis codes available
in our data set. Each disease is assigned a weight between 1 and 6 depending on disease
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Figure 2.2: Changes in the probability of no doctor visit by age and Charlson index
severity.5 The Charlson Index is the sum of these weights, truncated at 2. A value of
0 thus indicates that an individual had no diagnosis of any of the Charlson conditions
and a value of 1 or 2 indicates the presence of more severe co-morbidities.
As the Charlson Index is based on diagnosis codes and those codes are only available
if an individual has seen a doctor, the Charlson Index is endogenous. In order to
mitigate this problem, we construct the Charlson Index for the observations in the
third quarter of each year based on their diagnoses in the two prior quarters. For
example, the “Charlson 0” group in 2003 contains all individuals who had no diagnoses
of Charlson conditions in the first two quarters of 2003.
Figure 2.2 presents evidence for heterogeneous effects across the different groups.
The probability of no doctor visit generally increases after the reform with similar
magnitude for both genders. These increases are much smaller for individuals with a
Charlson Index of 2 than for the other groups. Sicker individuals thus seem to react
less to the reform than healthier ones. This holds true for all age groups and both
genders. Furthermore, there is some evidence that women who are older than 70 react
less to the reform than younger women conditional on the Charlson group. For men
there is no clear age pattern.
Overall, Figure 2.2 indicates that the change in the probability of no doctor visit
is stronger for healthy than for less healthy individuals. These descriptive results,
5 A list of the diseases and corresponding weights is displayed in Appendix A.1.
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however, rely on an endogenous measure of health. In order to test our hypothesis of
heterogeneous results without having to rely on the health information in the data,
we use a finite mixture model. This model allows us to estimate different effects for
separate groups in the population without having to explicitly stratify the data by
observable characteristics a priori.
2.4 Econometric framework
Our data consists of a panel of individuals across time and across different physician
types. Individuals can seek care from GPs (y1it) and/or specialists (y2it). The panel is
unbalanced over time, and each individual i is observed in Ti quarters. Over time and
physician types, individual i is thus observed 2 · Ti.
Suppose that individual i belongs to a latent class j for the entire observational pe-
riod. The probability of belonging to class j is πj. Within a latent class, we use bivariate
probits to jointly model the decision to visit a GP and/or a specialist. Although we are
mostly interested in whether individuals visit any doctor within a quarter, independent
of the type of doctor visited, we use the separate information on GPs and specialists in
order to gain potentially relevant information. This additional information might allow
a more accurate classification of individuals into latent classes. The joint probability
of the dependent variables over the observed period is the product of Ti independent
probabilities, given fixed class membership, i.e.,
Pr(y1i, y2i|xi, θj) =
Ti∏
t=1
Φ2[(2y1it − 1)xitβj, (2y2it − 1)xitγj, (2y1it − 1)(2y2it − 1)ρj](2.1)
where Φ2() stands for the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function and xi
denotes the vector of covariates that includes age, sex, seasonal fixed effects and year
fixed effects. θj contains the vector of parameters for GP visits (βj), the vector of
parameters for specialist visits (γj), and the parameter ρj. The latter indicates the
extent to which the errors in the underlying structural model covary.
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The log-likelihood function is given by
ln(L) =
I∑
i=1
ln
(
J∑
j=1
πjPr(y1i, y2i|xi, θj)
)
(2.2)
where I is the number of individuals in the dataset and J is the number of latent classes.
The likelihood function is maximized directly using the Newton-Raphson algorithm.
First and second derivatives are calculated numerically in Stata’s optimization pack-
age. In order to get a manageable data set for this estimation, we use a 3% random
subsample for this part of our analysis. This gives us on average a little more than
7,500 individuals per quarter.
For the interpretation of our results we calculate average marginal effects of the
variables in xi on Pr(y1i = 1|xi, θj) and Pr(y2i = 1|xi, θj). Standard errors of the
marginal effects are calculated using the delta method. As the reform effect is captured
by changes in the probability of no doctor visit, we also calculate marginal effects on
the probability of no doctor visit, i.e. on Pr(y1i = 0, y2i = 0|xi, θj).6
Furthermore, we calculate posterior probabilities of membership in the different
latent classes for each individual i as
Pr(y1i, y2i ∈ k|xi, θ̂) =
π̂kPr(y1i, y2i|xi, θ̂k)∑J
j=1 π̂jPr(y1i, y2i|xi, θ̂j)
(2.3)
where Pr(y1i, y2i|xi, θ̂k) is defined as in equation (2.1).
These posterior probabilities on the one hand help to see how well the different latent
classes are separated by the estimation. On the other hand, one can assign individuals
to a specific latent class based on their posterior probabilities and then characterize
each latent class using observable characteristics. In addition to the variables age and
sex that are included in xi we use the health information contained in the claims data
in this part of the analysis. As this information is only available conditional on doctor
visits we do not include it in the vector of control variables and it is thus external to
the estimation.
6 See Appendix A.2 for details.
Heterogeneous effects of a nonlinear price schedule 33
2.5 Results
Table 2.2 reports AIC and BIC information criteria for the finite mixture bivariate
probit model described in the last section with different number of latent classes. In
addition to finite mixture models with 2, 3, and 4 latent classes we estimated a standard
one-component bivariate probit model. Estimations with more than 4 latent classes
failed to converge and are likely overparameterized. The information criteria displayed
in Table 2.2 indicate that the model with 4 latent classes fits the data best. Further-
more, the posterior probabilities for the four latent classes are well separated as the
figure in Appendix A.3 shows. We therefore focus on the results of this model.
Marginal effects and their standard errors based on the results of our finite mixture
bivariate probit model with 4 latent classes are reported in Table 2.3. In addition to
the marginal effects in the different latent classes, Table 2.3 displays the overall effects
that are derived as weighted averages of the effects in the different latent classes. As a
comparison, the last column of Table 2.3 reports marginal effects and standard errors
based on the standard bivariate probit model.
The overall marginal effects and the marginal effects of the standard bivariate probit
model have the same signs and are similar in magnitude. Women have a higher prob-
ability to visit a GP and to visit a specialist at least once in a quarter than men. The
probability to visit a GP at least once increases with age, particularly so for individ-
uals aged 40 to 60. The probability to visit a specialist at least once only increases
for individuals in this age group. The probabilities to visit either type of doctor at
least once are lower in the summer months (quarter 2 and 3) and higher in the last
quarter compared to the first quarter of a year. Overall, the marginal effects thus show
expected signs.
Table 2.2: Model selection
Model N LogL df AIC BIC
Bivariate Probit 120,521 -148,116.6 25 296,283 296,526
2 LC FMM Bivariate Probit 120,521 -130,342.6 51 260,787 261,282
3 LC FMM Bivariate Probit 120,521 -122,594.1 77 245,342 246,089
4 LC FMM Bivariate Probit 120,521 -118,899.9 103 238,006 239,005
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Table 2.3: FMM bivariate probit – marginal effects
LC 1 LC 2 LC 3 LC 4 Overall BiProbit
GP
Female 0.028** 0.016 0.041** 0.082* 0.037*** 0.067***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.035) (0.009) (0.007)
Age Splines
Age 19-40 0.003*** 0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 40-60 0.002 0.002 0.007** 0.006 0.004** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 60-80 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.013) (0.003) (0.001)
Age > 80 -0.003 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.004 -0.008*
(0.007) (0.028) (0.013) (0.034) (0.008) (0.003)
Quarter Dummies
Q2 -0.005 -0.012 -0.007 -0.031*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Q3 -0.011* -0.021** -0.016** -0.046*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
Q4 0.017*** 0.008 0.022*** -0.014 0.012*** 0.010***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
Year Dummies
2003 0.007 -0.012 0.023*** -0.008 0.006 0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003)
2004 0.031*** -0.055*** -0.052*** 0.017 -0.022*** -0.027***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.004) (0.004)
2005 0.028** -0.033** -0.065*** 0.041 -0.018*** -0.027***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.023) (0.004) (0.004)
Specialist
Female 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.110*** 0.197*** 0.107*** 0.164***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.028) (0.009) (0.007)
Age Splines
Age 19-40 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.006** 0.000 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 40-60 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.014*** 0.004** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 60-80 -0.009*** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.006 -0.005* -0.006***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
Age > 80 -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.045 -0.012 -0.014***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.024) (0.007) (0.003)
Quarter Dummies
Q2 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.010 -0.003 -0.004
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003)
Q3 -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 -0.034** -0.009** -0.010**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003)
Q4 0.005 0.000 -0.006 -0.009 -0.002 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003)
Year Dummies
2003 0.041*** -0.014* -0.009 0.006 0.005 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
2004 0.004 -0.047*** -0.031*** -0.090*** -0.033*** -0.037***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
2005 -0.004 -0.028*** -0.017 -0.107*** -0.028*** -0.033***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.004) (0.004)
ρ 0.367*** 0.559*** 0.410*** 0.236*** 0.489***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.030) (0.008)
πj 0.265 0.248 0.355 0.132
Notes: πj is the probability of class membership in latent class j. Standard errors for the
marginal effects in parentheses. They are calculated using the delta method. Standard errors of
the underlying coefficients are clustered at the individual level. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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Of particular interest for our analysis are the changes in the probabilities of doctor
visits over the years. The effects of the year dummies capture these changes compared
to the reference year 2002. The overall results of the finite mixture bivariate probit
model and the standard bivariate probit concordantly show significant reductions in
the probabilities in the years 2004 and 2005 compared to 2002. In 2003, however, there
is no significant difference to 2002. As 2003 is a pre-reform year, the absence of an
effect in 2003 supports the assumption that there would have been no changes in the
outcome variable in the absence of the reform.
These overall effects, however, are composed of different effects in the latent classes.
While there are reductions in the probability to visit a GP and in the probability to
visit a specialist in latent classes 2 and 3 after the reform, in latent class 4 only the
probability of a specialist visit is reduced. In latent class 1, there is even an increase
in the probability to visit a GP after the reform while the probability to consult a
specialist does not change significantly.
The results in Table 2.3 thus suggest that the reform has an effect on access to
outpatient care and that this effect might be heterogeneous across individuals. How-
ever, as the per-quarter fee has to be paid at the first visit to a doctor in a quarter
independent of the type of doctor visited, while all additional visits to other doctors
are free of charge, it is more informative to analyze the change in the probability of not
visiting any doctor. The marginal effects on Pr(y1i = 0, y2i = 0|xi, θj) are displayed in
Figure 2.3.
The overall effect displayed in Figure 2.3 is not significant in the pre-reform year
2003 compared to 2002, but highly significant in the post-reform years 2004 and 2005. It
indicates that individuals went to see a doctor at least once with an almost 4 percentage
points lower probability after the reform. Furthermore, Figure 2.3 presents evidence
for heterogeneous reform effects: While latent class 1 does not react to the reform,
there are strong reactions in latent classes 2, 3 and 4.
In latent class 1, the probability of no doctor visit is reduced by about 1 percentage
point in the post-reform years 2004 and 2005 compared to 2002. However, the same
change already occurs in the pre-reform year 2003. These changes therefore cannot be
interpreted as reform effects.
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Figure 2.3: Changes in the probability of no doctor visit
Note: Error bars indicate 99%-confidence intervals.
In latent classes 2, 3 and 4 to the contrary, we see strong changes in the probability
of no doctor visit in the post-reform years compared to 2002. The changes in 2003 are
only significant in latent class 3 and much smaller in magnitude than the post-reform
changes. Individuals in latent classes 2, 3 and 4 thus react to the reform by going to
see a doctor with a lower probability.
Naturally, the question arises, what distinguishes the individuals belonging to the
different latent classes? Given the parameter estimates, we derive the posterior prob-
abilities for each individual i to belong to the four different latent classes as described
in the previous section. Each individual is then assigned to the latent class with the
highest posterior probability. Table 2.4 reports averages of observed characteristics
for the different latent classes. Beside age and sex, Table 2.4 includes information on
diagnoses in form of the Charlson Index and on prescription drugs that individuals
got from GPs and specialists. The latter are measured in defined daily doses (DDDs).7
These give a rough measure of drug consumption within the different classes and adjust
for the fact that different drugs can be of different potency. The DDDs do not take
into account, however, which amount of the drugs was actually prescribed.
Additionally, Table 2.4 shows the fraction of observations in each latent class that is
exempt from co-payments. Before and after the reform in 2004, individuals could apply
for an exemption from co-payments if the amount of their co-payments exceeded 2% of
7 DDDs are defined by the World Health Organization, see
http://www.whocc.no/ddd/definition_and_general_considera/ for a definition.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of latent classes
LC 1 LC 2 LC 3 LC 4
Age 57.43 44.03 56.72 44.64
Female 0.60 0.40 0.51 0.62
Charlson Index 0.98 0.17 0.85 0.47
Fraction Charlson=0 45.19 83.54 51.32 69.45
Fraction Charlson=1 9.57 6.17 9.80 8.25
Fraction Charlson=2 43.52 5.21 36.72 18.38
DDD 201.26 13.07 156.22 79.73
Exempt from co-payments 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.08
% of individuals 36.24 29.91 26.67 7.18
Notes: Fractions of Charlson Index do not add up to 1 because of
missing observations. DDD stands for defined daily dose.
their gross yearly income. Welfare recipients and chronically sick individuals could
be entirely exempt from co-payments before the reform. Since 2004, however, the 2%
rule also applies to welfare recipients and the chronically sick can only be exempt from
further payments within a year when they have already co-paid 1% of their gross yearly
income. Individuals can apply for these exemptions already at the beginning of each
year. In order to do so, they have to pay either 1% or 2% of their gross yearly income
up front to their insurer. The information on whether individuals are exempt from co-
payments is only available after the reform. The results in Table 2.4 thus only include
observations in the post-reform period.8
The last row of Table 2.4 shows that about 36% of individuals were assigned to
latent class 1, 30% to latent class 2, 27% to latent class 3 and 7% to latent class 4.
Comparing the different latent classes, it becomes evident that latent class 1 does not
seem to differ generally from the other latent classes in terms of age or sex. Observations
assigned to latent class 1 are on average of the same age as observations in latent class 3,
and the sex composition in latent class 1 is similar to the one in latent class 4. There
are differences, however, concerning the Charlson Index, the DDDs and exemptions
from co-payments. Observations in latent class 1 have a higher average Charlson
Index and an average DDD that is markedly higher than in the other latent classes.
Observations in latent class 1 thus have more severe diagnoses and take more potent
8 For all variables that are available before the reform the results are almost identical for the pre-reform
period.
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drugs on average, indicating that these observations are sicker than observations in the
other latent classes. This confirms the hypothesis that among the individuals who do
not react to the reform are the relatively sick.
Given the exemption rules described above, one could argue that individuals who
know ex ante that they will be exempt from all co-payments do not react to the intro-
duction of the per-quarter fee. In line with this argument, Table 2.4 shows that latent
class 1 has the largest fraction of observations that are exempt from co-payments. How-
ever, there are still 82% of observations in latent class 1 that do not react to the intro-
duction of the per-quarter fee, even though they are not exempt from co-payments in
general. The nonlinearity of the per-quarter fee thus results in heterogeneous reactions
not only through the general exemption rules.
Overall, the results from the finite mixture model confirm that the introduction
of the per-quarter fee in the German statutory health insurance had heterogeneous
effects: Around 36% of individuals are ex post assigned to the class that does not react
to the reform, while there are strong reactions among the rest. Consistent with the
theory of Keeler et al. (1977), the results indicate that among the individuals who do
not react to the introduction of the per-quarter fee are the ones who are relatively sick.
2.6 Discussion
Our results indicate that the per-quarter fee fails to influence the health care use of
high-risk individuals. One way to affect the behavior of high-risk individuals as well
might be to introduce a fee for every single visit to a doctor. However, the disadvantage
of a per-visit fee would be an increasing financial burden, especially for high-risk indi-
viduals. A different solution that would allow to affect high-risk individuals’ behavior
without increasing their financial burden is related to the idea of “shifted deductibles”
by van Kleef et al. (2009). The authors propose a new design of nonlinear price sched-
ules which might even decrease the financial burden for high-risk individuals. They
suggest to use a deductible that does not start at zero like a traditional deductible
but at an individual specific starting point which depends on risk characteristics of
the individuals. This overcomes the problem that high-risk individuals often know
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for sure that their expenditures will reach the level of the deductible in which case
co-payments will only have an income effect. As a shifted deductible increases the
uncertainty about the out-of-pocket expenditures, it may increase the incentive effect
for high-risk individuals.
Shifted deductibles in our application translate to allowing different numbers of
free doctor visits before the per-quarter fee has to be paid. Depending on their health
status some statutorily insured individuals in Germany should receive free care up to
a certain threshold. How many visits individuals receive for free before the fee applies
should optimally be individual specific. However, as van Kleef et al. (2009) note
using objective criteria like age and sex might be “practical and understandable to
consumers”.
Similar to van Kleef et al. (2009) we calculate the number of free visits that
maximize the uncertainty about the out-of-pocket expenditures based on the observed
number of visits for different groups of individuals. Figure 2.4 shows the empirical
cumulative distribution function of doctor visits in the third quarter of 2003 - truncated
at 10 - and the optimal number of free visits for six different age groups separately
for men and women. According to van Kleef et al. (2009) the optimal starting point
of a deductible maximizes the uncertainty about the out-of-pocket expenditures. We
use the variance as a measure of the uncertainty. In our application the variance is
maximized at the threshold that splits the empirical cumulative distribution function
into two equal parts. This is because people either have to pay the fee or not, which
is a dichotomous event. The variance of this event is thus maximized at a probability
of 0.5.
According to Figure 2.4, the optimal number of free visits is almost always unequal
to zero which is the current number of free visits. While young men should pay the fee at
the first visit in each quarter, young women should get one or two free visits per quarter.
This gender difference can be justified, for instance, by preventive examinations that
are provided regularly to young women. An additional cause might be the contraceptive
pill that is available only with prescription in Germany leading to additional doctor
visits for women compared to men.
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Figure 2.4: Empirical CDF of doctor visits and number of free visits grouped by age
and sex
With four free visits per quarter even a 60 year old woman, for instance, might
have a real chance to avoid the fee by slightly changing her behavior. Assuming that
people within the groups are homogeneous, implies that the entire population now faces
similar effective prices. However, it is very likely that the homogeneity assumption does
not hold in Figure 2.4 since the classification of the groups is too crude. An additional
dimension like the Charlson index as a measure of chronic conditions is certainly helpful
to make the groups more homogeneous. On the other hand, this measure is not as
objective as age and sex. Table 2.5 contains the optimal number of free visits by age
and Charlson groups separately for men and women. Since the level of doctor visits is
generally higher, women should get more free visits than men which would then also
cover, for instance, the higher level of preventive care. According to Table 2.5, women
up to the age of 50 should get one free visit per quarter but only if they have none of
the Charlson diseases. Otherwise they should get up to five free visits depending on
their risk characteristics.
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Table 2.5: Number of free visits separately for age, sex and Charlson index
Charlson index
Men Women
Age 0 1 2+ 0 1 2+
19-29 0 1 2 1 3 4
30-39 0 1 3 1 3 4
40-49 0 1 3 1 3 5
50-59 0 2 4 2 3 5
60-69 1 2 5 2 4 6
70+ 1 3 6 3 5 7
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present empirical evidence for heterogeneous effects of a nonlinear
price schedule that was introduced in the German statutory health insurance. The
nonlinearity takes the form of a co-payment for doctor visits that only has to be paid
for the first visit in each quarter of the year. Prices for doctor visits in the same quarter
drop to zero once the fee has been paid.
Following theoretical considerations on health care demand in the presence of non-
linear price schedules, we anticipate that the per-quarter fee changes access to health
care differently across individuals. In particular, individuals who expect in the begin-
ning of a quarter that they will have to visit a physician at some point within the
quarter have a lower incentive to change behavior than individuals who expect that no
visit will be necessary. As the expectations on doctor visits likely depend on individu-
als’ health status we expect that the reform effects vary between individuals with good
and bad health.
In a descriptive analysis we find that individuals in worse health react less to the
reform than healthier individuals. Our measure of health, however, depends on the
outcome variable. Namely, it is only observed if individuals visit a doctor. We therefore
allow for unobserved heterogeneity in a finite mixture model. The results of this model
show that some individuals react to the reform while others do not. Examining the
different groups indicates that those individuals who do not react are in worse health.
Our results are thus in line with the theoretical predictions of how nonlinear price
schedules affect the demand for medical care.
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Our findings allow two conclusions. First, the per-quarter fee seems to be effective
to increase cost consciousness for many individuals, in particular the healthier ones.
Second, there are individuals – among them the sick – who do not react to the introduc-
tion of the per-quarter fee. The reform thus seems to fail to increase cost consciousness
and to reduce moral hazard in this group.
Following the idea of van Kleef et al. (2009) we suggest a slight refinement to the
current system that might be more effective in reducing moral hazard for all individ-
uals. We suggest shifted thresholds as a means to change the behavior of higher-risk
individuals as well. With a shifted threshold individuals would get different numbers
of doctor visits for free in each quarter before having to pay a fee. Since the number
of free visits increases with decreasing health status, even high-risk individuals would
have a chance to avoid the new fee by changing their behavior. Furthermore, allowing
a certain number of free visits for high-risk individuals has the potential of reducing
the financial burden for these individuals.
Appendices
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A.1 Definition of Charlson index
Table 2.6: Definition of Charlson Score
Charlson Comorbidity Assigned Weights
1 Myocardial infarction 1
2 Congestive heart failure 1
3 Peripheral vascular disease 1
4 Cerebrovascular disease 1
5 Dementia 1
6 Chronic pulmonary disease 1
7 Rheumatic disease 1
8 Peptic ulcer disease 1
9 Mild liver disease 1
10 Diabetes without complications 1
11 Diabetes with chronic complications 2
12 Hemiplegia or paraplegia 2
13 Renal disease 2
14 Cancer 2
15 Moderate or severe liver disease 3
16 Metastatic carcinoma 6
17 AIDS/HIV 6
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A.2 Marginal Effects
This appendix describes how the marginal effects on the probabilities of each
type of doctor visit and on the joint probability that neither type of visit occurs
(Pr(y1i = 0, y2i = 0|xi, θj)) are calculated. Standard errors for the marginal effects
are derived using the delta method. Each marginal effect is calculated for each indi-
vidual i and for each of the J latent classes. We report the average marginal effects
of each latent class j as the average over all individual marginal effects in this class.
Furthermore, the weighted average of the effects in the different latent classes gives an
overall effect. For continuous explanatory variables the marginal effects are calculated
using the calculus method. Marginal effects of binary variables are calculated with the
finite difference method.
For a continuous variable x the marginal effects on Pr(yki = 1|xi, θ̂j) with k ∈ {1, 2}
in latent class j for individual i are calculated as
MExiPr(y1i = 1|xi, θ̂j)j = β̂x,jφ(x′iβ̂j) (2.4)
MExiPr(y2i = 1|xi, θ̂j)j = γ̂x,jφ(x′iγ̂j) (2.5)
where φ() stands for the standard normal density function. We report
1
I
∑I
i=1MExiPr(yki = 1|xi, θ̂j)j.
The marginal effects of a continuous variable x on the joint probability for y1i and
y2i in latent class j are calculated for individual i as follows:
MExiPr(y1i = 0, y2i = 0|xi, θ̂j)j =
∂Φ2(q1ix
′
iβ̂j, q2ix
′
itγ̂j, q1iq2iρ̂j)
∂xi
(2.6)
= q1iβ̂x,jφ(q1ix
′
itβ̂j)Φ
q2ix′itγ̂j − q21iq2iρ̂jx′itβ̂j√
1− ρ̂2j

+ q2iγ̂x,jφ(q2ix
′
itγ̂j)Φ
q1ix′iβ̂j − q1iq22iρ̂jx′iγ̂j√
1− ρ̂2j

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where Φ2() stands for the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function, Φ() indi-
cates the standard normal cdf, and qki = 2yki − 1, with k ∈ {1, 2}.
The calculation of marginal effects of discrete variables is illustrated for the year
dummies. The marginal effects of the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 with 2002 as reference
in latent class j for individual i are calculated as
MEyear,iPr(y1i = 1|xi, θ̂j)j = Φ(x′iβ̂j + β̂year,j)− Φ(x′iβ̂j) (2.7)
MEyear,iPr(y2i = 1|xi, θ̂j)j = Φ(x′iγ̂j + γ̂year,j)− Φ(x′iγ̂j) (2.8)
for the marginal probabilities, and as
MEyear,iPr(y1i = 0, y2i = 0|xi, θ̂j)j = Φ2
(
q1i(x
′
iβ̂j + β̂year,j), q2i(x
′
iγ̂j + γ̂year,j), q1iq2iρ̂j
)
− Φ2(q1ix′iβ̂j, q2ix′iγ̂j, q1iq2iρ̂j) (2.9)
for the joint probability of y1i and y2i. β̂j and γ̂j now stand for the vectors of parameter
estimates for all variables excluding the year indicators. Marginal effects for the variable
female and the quarter dummies are calculated analogously.
The overall marginal effect, i.e. the marginal effect averaged over the latent classes,
for any continuous or discrete variable x is then derived as weighted average of the
marginal effects across the different latent classes
MExi =
J∑
j=1
πjMExi,j (2.10)
Again, averages over all individuals are reported.
Standard errors for the average marginal effects are derived using the delta method
that delivers the variance for each average marginal effect as
V ar(ME) = ∇′gV ar(θ)∇g (2.11)
where θ is the vector of all parameters that are estimated (βj,γj,ρj, and pj, where
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πj =
exp(pj)
1+
∑C
c=1 exp(pc)
with C = J − 1), and ∇g stands for the gradient of the marginal
effect, ME = g(θ), with respect to θ. In order to calculate the variance on the average
marginal effect, we set each element in the gradient to its sample average.
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A.3 Posterior probabilities
Figure 2.5: Posterior probabilities
Chapter 3
Extensions of hurdle models for overdispersed count
data†
3.1 Introduction
Proposed by Mullahy (1986), the notion of a hurdle model is still very popular in
modeling count data. It can be used in various contexts, such as job changes, fish-
ing, or use of health care. The hurdle model typically combines a binary model to
model participation (for example, modeling the patient’s decision to visit the doctor)
with a zero-truncated count data model to model the extent of participation for those
participating (for example, modeling the number of doctor visits). In contrast with
a single-index model, the hurdle model permits heterogeneous effects for individuals
below or above the hurdle. In many applications the hurdle is set at zero and can
therefore also solve the problem of excess zeros, that is, the presence of more zeros
in the data than what was predicted by single-index count-data models. There are
many possible combinations of binary and truncated count-data models. An often-
used model combines a probit or logit model with a zero-truncated negative binomial
model (for example, Vesterinen et al., 2010 and Wong et al., 2010).
In health economics, for instance, Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) has been one of the
† Parts of this chapter have been published in Farbmacher (2011a)
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first studies to analyze the number of doctor visits using a hurdle model. The number
of doctor visits may serve as a proxy for demand for health care. This measure may
be determined by a two-part decision process. At first, it is up to the patient whether
to visit a doctor. After the first contact, though, the physician influences the intensity
of treatment (Stoddart and Barer, 1981 and Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995). Assuming
that the error terms of the binary and the truncated models are uncorrelated, the
maximization process can be separated. In this case, one can first maximize a binary
model with at least one doctor visit as the dependent variable using the full sample.
Second, one can estimate a zero-truncated regression separately using only observations
with positive counts.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity, Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) applied a
zero-truncated model based on the negative binomial distribution. While this often
improves the fit of the model, some of the underlying assumptions are mainly based
on convenience. Recent developments in the count data literature make it possible
to relax these assumptions. For instance, Greene (2008) proposed a generalization of
the negative binomial model and Dhaene and Santos Silva (2011) showed a general
way to increase the flexibility of models in which unobserved heterogeneity has to be
integrated out. Based on these findings, I develop extensions of the truncated negative
binomial and the truncated Poisson log-normal model, which can be used to make the
second part of hurdle models more flexible.
This chapter is structured as follows: The next section describes the basic specifi-
cations of truncated count data models and explains the proposed model extensions.
These extensions are then applied to the Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) data set in section
3. Section 4 concludes.
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3.2 Econometric models
To account for unobserved heterogeneity, inference is often based on the marginal
distribution h(yi|xi) obtained after integrating out ui:
h(yi|xi) =
∫ ∞
0
f(yi|xi, ui)g(ui|xi)dui (3.1)
where g(·) is called the mixing distribution. Santos Silva (2003) mentioned that there
are two alternative approaches to construct hurdle models if unobserved heterogeneity
is present. On the one hand, if f(yi|xi, ui) is an untruncated count data distribution,
the mixing is done in the first step and the truncating follows in the second step. On the
other hand, if f(yi|xi, ui) is already a truncated distribution, the order between mixing
and truncating is the other way round. The choice between these two alternatives is
not innocuous, and this seemingly slight difference can lead to substantially different
results. The reason for this is the assumption of independence, g(ui|xi) = g(ui), which
is required before integration. It can be assumed to hold in the actual population or
in the truncated one, but generally not in both populations at the same time (see also
footnote 4 in Santos Silva, 2003).1
To get a closed-form solution of the integral in (3.1), all truncated models based
on the negative binomial distribution belong to the class of models where the mixing
is done in the first step. If, for instance, f(yi|xi, ui) is of the Poisson form and ui is
independent of xi and follows a gamma distribution, we obtain the negative binomial
(NB) models. Greene (2008) proposed the NB-P model which encompasses the often
used NB-1 and NB-2. Its probability function is
Pr(yi = n|xi) =
Γ(mi + yi)
Γ(mi)Γ(yi + 1)
(
mi
λi +mi
)mi ( λi
λi +mi
)yi
for n ≥ 0 (3.2)
1 A simple example illustrates this problem: Assume that a count data variable is generated by a Poisson
process where the mean depends on a covariate x and an unobserved variable u. Independence holds in
the actual population. For a given value of x, it is now more likely to get truncated if the unobserved
individual effect is lower than average. As a consequence, x and u are correlated in the truncated
population.
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where λi = exp(xiβ), mi = 1δλ
(2−P )
i = exp((2−P )xiβ− ln(δ)). δ and P are parameters
to be estimated in addition to β. Setting P = 1 or P = 2 gives the NB-1 or NB-2
model.
I use a truncated version of the NB-P model to analyze strictly positive counts. It
can be obtained by dividing the probability function by 1− Pr(yi = 0|xi):
Pr(yi = k|yi > 0,xi) =
Pr(yi = k|xi)
1− Pr(yi = 0|xi)
for k ≥ 1 (3.3)
Thus the log-likelihood contribution of the zero-truncated NB-P is
lnLIi = lnΓ(mi + yi)− lnΓ(mi)− lnΓ(yi + 1)
+ln(si) + yiln
(
λi
λi +mi
)
− ln(1− si) (3.4)
where si = (mi/(λi +mi))mi .
While the likelihood of the zero-truncated NB-P model has a closed-form expression,
there is no such result for the zero-truncated Poisson log-normal model. Winkelmann
(2004a), for instance, used the latter model to analyze demand for health care. In
contrast to the NB-P model, f(yi|xi, ui) is now already a truncated probability func-
tion (namely, the zero-truncated Poisson function) and ui is log-normal distributed, in-
dependent of xi. The likelihood contribution of the zero-truncated Poisson log-normal
model is
LIIi =
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−exp(xiβ + σεi))exp(xiβ + σεi)yi
(1− exp(−exp(xiβ + σεi)))yi!
φ(εi)dεi (3.5)
where εi = ln(ui) is standard normally distributed and φ(·) denotes the density function
of the standard normal distribution. It has to be approximated numerically (e.g. by
Gauss-Hermite quadrature). Dhaene and Santos Silva (2011) proposed a general way to
increase the flexibility of models in which unobserved heterogeneity has to be integrated
out. Their basic idea is “that replacing g(·) with some other density is equivalent
to transforming εi monotonically and keeping g(·)”. Using this procedure, we can
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thus relax the distributional assumptions about εi and get the following likelihood
contribution:
LIIIi =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(yi|xiβ + σd(εi))φ(εi)dεi (3.6)
where f(·) denotes the probability function of the zero-truncated Poisson model as in
equation (3.5) and d(·) links the true but unknown density of εi to the maintained
distributional assumptions about g(·). To make the model from (3.5) more flexible,
we can replace εi with some approximation of d(εi). Dhaene and Santos Silva (2011)
suggested to use a polynomial in εi or a transformation to normality. For the latter, they
use d(εi) = sinh(θεi)/θ. I choose the same transformation and adapt their procedure
to the truncated model. After a change of variable, the integrals in (3.5) and (3.6) can
be written as
LII,IIIi =
1√
π
∫ ∞
−∞
f(yi|xiβ + σd(
√
2νi))exp(−ν2i )dνi (3.7)
where d(·) is the identity function in model II and d(·) = sinh(θ
√
2νi)/θ in model III. If
θ goes to zero, d(·) becomes the identity function and model III converges to model II.
Since there is no analytical solution of the integral in (3.7), it has to be approximated
numerically. The likelihood contributions of the actually estimated models therefore
are
LII,IIIi =̇
1√
π
R∑
r=1
f(yi|xiβ + σd(
√
2νr))ωr (3.8)
where νr and ωr are the nodes and weights for the quadrature.2
2 Details about the approximation are given in Appendices A.1 and A.2.
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To compare the results of the models, I calculate relative marginal effects which in
the zero-truncated negative binomial models are
∂E(·)+
∂xj
1
E(·)+
= βj −
simi
(
Qβjln(
mi+exp(xiβ)
mi
) +
miQβj+exp(xiβ)βj
mi+exp(xiβ)
−Qβj
)
1− si
(3.9)
where Q = (2 − P ). Generally, marginal effects of models based on integration have
to be approximated numerically. The relative marginal effects of the zero-truncated
Poisson log-normal models are
∂E(·)+
∂xj
1
E(·)+
=
∫ ∞
−∞
βj −
exp(−µi)µiβj
1− exp(−µi)
φ(εi)dεi (3.10)
where µi = exp(xiβ + σεi) and µi = exp(xiβ + σ(sinh(θεi)/θ)) for model II or III,
respectively. In the considered application, however, evaluating the marginal effects
at εi = 0 gives almost the same results and eases the calculation of standard errors.
Therefore I report the marginal effects evaluated at εi = 0.3 The reported marginal
effects of binary regressors are the relative mean differences between groups.
3.3 Application
In this section, I use the data studied by Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) to illustrate the
model extensions described above. The aim of their study was to emphasize that the
decision to contact a physician is a two-part decisionmaking process. The importance of
this two-part process was strengthened by a former institutional setting of the statutory
health insurance in Germany: “[O]nce [the patient] has submitted the sickness voucher
to his physician of choice, medical services for the relevant quarter are supplied by this
physician only” (Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995, my insertions). If the patient wanted
to visit another doctor in the relevant quarter, he needed a referral from the doctor
whom he visited first. The physicians thus were “gatekeepers” in the statutory health
insurance system, which covered more than 90% of those living in Germany.
3 Table 3.3 in Appendix A.3 shows the marginal effects based on quadrature.
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The dataset is a cross-section of 5,096 individuals from the 1985 German Socio-
Economic Panel. The authors separately analyzed the number of visits to a general
practitioner (GP) and the number of visits to a specialist in the last three months. In
both cases they used a zero-truncated NB-1 in the second part of the hurdle model.
Using the same dataset, Santos Silva and Windmeijer (2001) showed that an important
assumption of the hurdle model, namely the assumption of a single illness spell, is
violated in the case of visits to specialists. Therefore I only use visits to GPs to
illustrate the model extensions discussed in the previous section. Table 3.1 shows the
variables used in the analysis with descriptive statistics for the full and the truncated
sample.
Table 3.2 presents the relative marginal effects for the models discussed in this
chapter. The vector of explanatory variables is the same as in Pohlmeier and Ulrich
(1995).4 Relative marginal effects are reported only for those variables that are signifi-
cant at the 10% level in at least one of the specifications. Within the negative binomial
models, the zero-truncated NB-P model has the greatest likelihood. The additionally
estimated parameter P is around 1.33 and significantly different from 1 and 2. Thus
the zero-truncated NB-1 and NB-2 models are rejected in favor of the NB-P model.
The relative marginal effects of the NB-P model tend to be larger in magnitude than
the NB-1 results reported by Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995). In particular the effects of
physician density and private insurance increase distinctly in the NB-P model and are
both now clearly significant.
The specifications based on the Poisson log-normal distribution fit the data even
better than its negative binomial alternatives. In addition, a Vuong (1989) test is
performed to select between the truncated NB-P model and the flexible version of the
truncated Poisson log-normal model more formally. Since both models are overlapping,
I have first tested whether they overlap in this particular application. The additional
parameters are, however, significantly different from the values which would reduce
them to a standard truncated Poisson model. The Vuong test statistic for the flexible
4 The variation in some of these variables is probably endogenous. The effect of private insurance, for
example, might be partly due to a selection effect. Therefore, in what follows I will not reveal causal
mechanisms. The aim of the following discussion is to show how model choice can affect the estimates
in the analysis of overdispersed count data.
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Table 3.2: Relative marginal effects
Zero-truncated
Negative binomial Poisson log-normal
NB 1 NB 2 NB P Standard Flexible
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Education -0.002 -0.016 -0.016 -0.012 -0.012
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Physician density 0.548 1.129 1.003 0.842 0.839
(0.289) (0.656) (0.450) (0.415) (0.433)
Female 0.041 0.050 0.060 0.091 0.100
(0.035) (0.056) (0.047) (0.039) (0.040)
Chronic illness 0.333 0.476 0.463 0.399 0.403
(0.141) (0.099) (0.110) (0.069) (0.074)
Private insurance -0.073 -0.198 -0.195 -0.111 -0.105
(0.047) (0.063) (0.075) (0.054) (0.056)
Heavy labor job 0.070 0.218 0.152 0.104 0.093
(0.046) (0.085) (0.065) (0.052) (0.055)
Self-determining -0.074 -0.099 -0.119 -0.105 -0.109
(0.034) (0.050) (0.042) (0.033) (0.033)
Sick leave 0.225 0.408 0.376 0.325 0.328
(0.101) (0.106) (0.096) (0.071) (0.071)
δ 4.082 5.490 5.347 — —
(0.340) (1.886) (0.952)
P 1.000 2.000 1.327 — —
(fixed) (fixed) (0.069)
σ — — — 0.982 0.885
(0.030) (0.043)
θ — — — — 0.380
(0.051)
Log-likelihood -3,945.08 -3,931.00 -3,921.16 -3,886.16 -3,881.90
Dependent variable: Number of visits to a GP given any use of GP services.
Models also account for the other covariates displayed in table 3.1.
Standard errors are obtained by the delta rule.
Vuong test statistic for (5) versus (3): 3.72. H0 : both models are equivalent. The test statistic
is standard normally distributed.
Extensions of hurdle models 58
version of the truncated Poisson log-normal model against the NB-P model is 3.72
and hence the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the specification based on the
Poisson log-normal distribution. The relative marginal effects of the truncated Poisson
log-normal models are mostly in between the NB-1 and NB-P results. While the
gender difference is insignificant in the negative binomial models, there is a significant
difference between men and women according to the Poisson log-normal models.
3.4 Conclusion
Hurdle models based on the zero-truncated Poisson log-normal distribution are rarely
used in applied work, although they incorporate some advantages compared with their
negative binomial alternatives. These models are appealing from a theoretical point of
view and, additionally, perform much better in many applications.
Recent developments in the count data literature make it possible to relax com-
monly imposed assumptions of hurdle models. I use these techniques to propose two
extensions of hurdle models. Both extensions nest the models that have been estimated
previously. This allows one to simply test these models by appropriate parametric
restrictions. An example from health economics shows that the more flexible models
can lead to distinctly different marginal effects.
Appendices
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A.1 Gauss-Hermite Quadrature
When there is no analytical solution of an integral, it can be approximated numerically
using e.g. Gauss-Hermite quadrature. The likelihood contributions that are actually
used in the estimation can be derived by:
LII,IIIi =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(yi|xiβ + σd(εi))φ(εi)dεi
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(yi|xiβ + σd(εi))
1√
2π
exp(−1
2
ε2i )dεi
after a change of variable εi =
√
2νi,
LII,IIIi =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(yi|xiβ + σd(
√
2νi))
1√
2π
exp(−1
2
(
√
2νi)
2)
√
2dνi
=
1√
π
∫ ∞
−∞
f(yi|xiβ + σd(
√
2νi))exp(−ν2i )dνi
=̇
1√
π
R∑
r=1
f(yi|xiβ + σd(
√
2νr))ωr
where =̇ indicates the approximation.
A.2 Implementation in Stata
The models discussed in this chapter are estimated in Stata using adaptive
Gauss-Hermite quadrature. Adaptive quadrature shifts and scales the quadrature
points to place them under the peak of the integrand which most likely improves the
approximation (compare section 6.3.2 in Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004 for a de-
tailed discussion). Many Stata commands such as xtpoisson implement an approach
proposed by Liu and Pierce (1994). They argue that the mode of the integrand and the
curvature at the mode can be used as shifting and scaling factors. Instead of calculating
these factors, I use the corresponding values of the standard (untruncated) Poisson log-
normal model to implement the adaptive quadrature. The reason for this is a built-in
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Figure 3.1: Integrand of zero-truncated model (solid curve) and standard model
(dashed curve)
command in Stata that only gives the corresponding values for the standard Poisson
log-normal model. The integrand, however, is often very similar in both models, espe-
cially for high values of the dependent variable. This indicates that these values might
also be good guesses for the scaling and shifting factors of the zero-truncated models.
Figure 3.1 shows the integrands of the standard and zero-truncated Poisson log-normal
model. In this example they are almost identical for higher values of the dependent
variable.
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A.3 Relative marginal effects using quadrature
Table 3.3: Relative marginal effects using quadrature
Zero-truncated
Poisson log-normal
Standard Flexible
Education -0.012 -0.012
(0.007) (0.007)
Physician density 0.843 0.838
(0.459) (0.452)
Female 0.091 0.100
(0.037) (0.036)
Chronic illness 0.405 0.408
(0.061) (0.058)
Private insurance -0.111 -0.105
(0.058) (0.057)
Heavy labor job 0.105 0.093
(0.057) (0.057)
Self-determining -0.105 -0.108
(0.032) (0.035)
Sick leave 0.327 0.329
(0.064) (0.066)
Models also account for the other covariates displayed in table 3.1.
Bootstrap standard errors based on 100 replications.
Flexible model converged in only 66% of the replications.
Chapter 4
Continuously updated GMM with many weak
moment conditions:
An application in labor economics†
4.1 Introduction
Endogeneity is a common phenomenon in applied econometrics and it generally
prevents a causal interpretation of ordinary least squares regressions. The availabil-
ity of valid instruments can solve this problem. One criterion for a valid instrument is
sufficient correlation between the endogenous variable and the instrument. Instruments
that do not fulfill this criterion are called weak. Weak instruments are not unusual in
applied econometrics. Angrist and Krueger (1991)’s quarter-of-birth instrument is a
famous example for a weak instrument. They used it to estimate individuals’ returns
to education. Yogo (2004) presented an example of weak instruments in macroeco-
nomics. The poor performance of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation with weak
instruments has been extensively discussed in Staiger and Stock (1997)’s seminal study.
Thus, there is a need for an estimator with better properties than 2SLS in case of weak
instruments.
The continuous updating estimator, for instance, could be such an estimator.
† Parts of this chapter have been published in Farbmacher (2011b)
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Hansen et al. (1996) showed that the continuous updating estimator is typically less
median biased than 2SLS. However, there are still some problems remaining. For in-
stance, Guggenberger (2005, 2008) mentioned that its criterion function is difficult to
optimize, which can lead to spurious results. Moreover, the dispersion of the estimator
is often tremendously high, which may complicate the interpretation of the results (see
e.g. Hansen et al., 1996 and Hausman et al., 2011). Furthermore, the usual formula
for the variance estimator seems to understate the true variance especially when iden-
tification is weak (see e.g. Han and Phillips, 2005 or Newey and Windmeijer, 2009).
For this reason, Newey and Windmeijer (2009) proposed a new variance estimator for
generalized empirical likelihood (GEL) estimators. It addresses the problem that usual
standard errors are too small when there are many weak instruments. In Monte Carlo
simulations they apply the new variance estimator for a member of GEL estimators,
namely the continuous updating estimator. t-statistics based on the new variance
estimator have nearly correct size in a wide range of cases. I replicate their simulations
for the linear model using the continuous updating estimator with usual standard errors
and the many weak instruments standard errors of Newey and Windmeijer. Moreover,
I report results for a wider range of the parameters involved. For comparison the jack-
knife instrumental variable estimator (JIVE2) of Angrist et al. (1999) and two-stage
least squares have also been estimated. Finally, I re-estimate Angrist and Krueger
(1991)’s returns to education using these estimators and additionally compare them to
the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator.
An additional finding of my Monte Carlo simulations is that two-stage least squares
estimates are particularly poor starting values for the continuous updating estimator,
especially when the sample size is small and/or the identification is weak. A potential
reason for this is the likely presence of local optima and the fact that the continuous
updating estimator often converges to these local optima if they are close to the 2SLS
estimates. The nearness of the local optima to the 2SLS estimates then suggest that
the performance of the continuous updating estimator is also affected by the proper-
ties of 2SLS. Furthermore, this study shows that extreme estimates of the continuous
updating estimator, which are often reported in Monte Carlo simulations, are more
likely to be a failure of the optimization routine than a property of the continuous
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updating estimator.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the continuous
updating estimator and the new variance estimator proposed by Newey andWindmeijer
(2009). Section 3 first explains the design of the conducted Monte Carlo simulation and
discusses the expected performance of 2SLS under these conditions. Then, it provides
the simulation results. Section 4 applies the new variance estimator to the Angrist and
Krueger (1991) data set. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Continuously updated GMM
The model considered here is linear and homoskedastic with
yi = x
′
iβ0 + ui (4.1)
where yi is a scalar, xi is a l× 1 vector of explanatory variables and β0 is a l× 1 vector
of true parameters satisfying the moment conditions
E(ziui) = 0 (4.2)
where zi is a m× 1 vector of instruments. Denote
gi(β) = zi(yi − x′iβ), ĝ(β) = n−1
n∑
i=1
gi(β), (4.3)
Ω̂(β) = n−1
n∑
i=1
ziz
′
i(yi − x′iβ)2 (4.4)
where β is a l × 1 parameter vector to be estimated. Hansen (1982)’s two-step
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is given by
β̈ = arg min
β
Q̈(β), Q̈(β) = ĝ(β)′Ŵ ĝ(β)/2, Ŵ = Ω̂(β̇)−1 (4.5)
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with β̇ is obtained using a suboptimal choice of the weighting matrix. Then, Ŵ min-
imizes the asymptotic variance of β̈. The continuous updating estimator proposed by
Hansen et al. (1996) simultaneously minimizes over β in the sample analogue of the
moment conditions and the weighting matrix, that is
β̂ = arg min
β
Q̂(β), Q̂(β) = ĝ(β)′Ω̂(β)−1ĝ(β)/2. (4.6)
The jth element of the first derivative of Q̂(β) is
∂Q̂(β)
∂βj
=
∂ĝ(β)
∂βj
′
Ω̂(β)−1ĝ(β)− ĝ(β)′Ω̂(β)−1Λ̂j(β)Ω̂(β)−1ĝ(β) (4.7)
and the jkth element of the second derivative of Q̂(β) is
∂2Q̂(β)
∂βjβk
=
∂2ĝ(β)
∂βj∂βk
Ω̂(β)−1ĝ(β) +
∂ĝ(β)
∂βj
′
Ω̂(β)−1
∂ĝ(β)
∂βk
− 2∂ĝ(β)
∂βj
′
Ω̂(β)−1Λ̂k(β)Ω̂(β)
−1ĝ(β)− 2∂ĝ(β)
∂βk
′
Ω̂(β)−1Λ̂j(β)Ω̂(β)
−1ĝ(β)
− ĝ(β)′Ω̂(β)−1∂Λ̂j(β)
∂βk
′
Ω̂(β)−1ĝ(β)
+ 4ĝ(β)′Ω̂(β)−1Λ̂k(β)Ω̂(β)
−1Λ̂j(β)Ω̂(β)
−1ĝ(β) (4.8)
where in the considered linear model
∂ĝ(β)
∂βj
= n−1
n∑
i=1
−zixij,
∂2ĝ(β)
∂βj∂βk
= 0, (4.9)
Λ̂j(β) =
∂Ω̂(β)
∂βj
/2 = n−1
n∑
i=1
−ziz′ixij(yi − x′iβ), (4.10)
∂Λ̂j(β)
∂βk
= n−1
n∑
i=1
ziz
′
ixijxik. (4.11)
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The usual formula of the variance-covariance matrix is
V̂c =
(
Ĝ′Ω̂(β̂)−1Ĝ
)−1
, with Ĝ =
∂ĝ(β̂)
∂β
=
(
∂ĝ(β̂)
∂β1
, ... ,
∂ĝ(β̂)
∂βl
)
. (4.12)
According to the usual formula, the asymptotic variance of β̂ is V̂c/n. Standard errors
based on this matrix are often too small in applications with many instruments (see
e.g. Han and Phillips, 2005). t-statistics based on the new variance estimator of Newey
and Windmeijer (2009) have, however, nearly correct size in a wide range of cases. The
proposed variance estimator of Newey and Windmeijer (2009) is
V̂ = Ĥ−1D̂(β̂)′Ω̂(β̂)−1D̂(β̂)Ĥ−1 (4.13)
where Ĥ is a Hessian term containing the elements defined in equation (4.8) and D̂j(β̂)
is the jth column of D̂(β̂):
D̂j(β̂) =
∂ĝ(β̂)
∂βj
− Λ̂j(β̂)Ω̂(β̂)−1ĝ(β̂). (4.14)
The asymptotic variance of β̂ is V̂ /n. Newey and Windmeijer (2009, p.692) noted
that V̂ converges to V̂c when m is fixed and identification is strong. In this case,
ĝ(β̂) converges in probability to zero and the second term in equation (4.14) vanishes.
Furthermore, the Hessian term is then equal to the numerator in equation (4.13).
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4.3 Monte Carlo simulation
4.3.1 Simulation design
The design of the Monte Carlo experiment is
yi = α + βxxi + ui
xi = z
′
iπ + vi
ui = ρvi +
√
1− ρ2wi
vi ∼ N(0, 1), wi ∼ N(0, 1), zi ∼ N(0, I), π =
√
CP
mn
ιm
where ιm is a m-vector of ones. x has no causal effect on y (i.e. βx = 0) and the
constant is set to zero as well. Firstly, I use the same parameters as Newey and
Windmeijer (2009) to replicate some of their results. The sample size n is 200 in their
simulation; the concentration parameter CP is equal to 10, 20 or 35; the degree of
endogeneity ρ is equal to 0.3, 0.5 or 0.9; the number of instruments m is 3 or 15;
the number of replications is 10,000. Secondly, I extend their analysis using a wider
range of the simulation parameters. Throughout the continuous updating estimator is
estimated with Mata’s optimize function. The gradient and the Hessian are calculated
analytically.
I use Hahn and Hausman (2002)’s expression for the approximate finite sample bias
of the 2SLS estimator as a theoretical guideline for the interpretation of the Monte
Carlo results:1
E(b2SLS)− β ≈
cov(u, v)
n
m
π′Rπ + var(v)
=
ρ
CP
m2
ι′mRιm + 1
(4.15)
1 Bun and Windmeijer (2011) recently developed an alternative bias approximation. They compared
it with the Hahn and Hausman approximation and showed that the latter may be inaccurate for
modest m.
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where R = E[z′z/n] and z = (z′1 · · · z′n)′. The equality in the second line follows from
the choice of the simulation parameter π. Now, n is no longer in the denominator
implying that increasing n does not reduce bias. Thus we cannot expect unbiased
estimates from 2SLS under the asymptotics where π =
√
a/n, even if the sample size
is large as, for instance, in Angrist and Krueger (1991). This has been shown by
Staiger and Stock (1997) and more recently by Hahn and Hausman (2002). According
to equation (4.15), the approximate bias of 2SLS is increasing in ρ andm and decreasing
in CP/m, which is the population F -statistic from the first stage regression.
For comparison purposes, Table 4.5 in the appendix replicates the results from
Newey and Windmeijer (2009). It reports median bias and rejection frequencies of
Wald tests for the null hypothesis H0 : βx = 0. These are very similar to Newey
and Windmeijer’s Monte Carlo results. Figure 4.2 to 4.4 report the results graph-
ically for a wider range of the simulation parameters and for different sample sizes
(n = 25, 100, 800). These results are discussed in section 4.3.3. Only one parameter is
varied at a time. The other two values are fixed at a certain level (ρ = 0.9, m = 5,
CP = 10). When m is varied, I additionally hold the first stage F -statistic fixed as
the number of instruments increases. It implies that the set of instruments is equally
strong with increasing m. Setting π =
√
CP
n
ιm the approximate bias becomes
E(b2SLS)− β ≈
ρ
CP
m
ι′mRιm + 1
(4.16)
which does now not depend on m given that the first stage F -statistic is fixed.
4.3.2 Continuous updating estimator and starting values
In the next section, I compare the theoretical considerations about the approximate
mean bias of 2SLS to the simulation results. However, instead of the mean bias, I
report the median bias from the simulations. The reason for this is the “no-moments
problem” of the continuous updating estimator that has been reported extensively in
the literature. Guggenberger (2005, 2008), for instance, evaluated the criterion function
of the continuous updating estimator using a grid over the parameter space, and his
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results do therefore not rely on a minimization routine. He found that the contin-
uous updating estimator takes on large values with a much higher probability than
2SLS. This leads to a substantial dispersion in the estimates. In a recent Monte Carlo
simulation Hausman et al. (2011) compared the performance of different estimators –
among them the continuous updating estimator. They used a derivative based opti-
mization which could potentially not converge. In their results some extreme estimates
of βx completely preclude the interpretation of the first two moments of the continuous
updating estimator.
The following simulation suggests that these extreme estimates are, however, from
estimations that did not converge. I provide two different sets of estimates from the
continuous updating estimator. The first set of estimates is based on just one optimiza-
tion in which the starting values are obtained from 2SLS, which might be considered
as a natural choice of the starting values.2 On the other hand, for the second set of
estimates I use five fixed starting values (FSV) for βx (-2,-1,0,1,2)3 and additionally the
2SLS estimates. The results of the continuous updating estimator in the second set are
then obtained from the optimization with the lowest criterion function Q̂(β) given that
the optimization converged. Table 4.1 shows measures of central tendency and disper-
sion for both sets of estimates and additionally the fraction of simulation replications
that converged. It is interesting to see that some extreme estimates of βx completely
preclude the interpretation of the mean and the variance whenever the results contain
some estimates from optimizations that did not converge. On the other hand, when
I focus on converged optimizations, I can eliminate these extreme estimates (compare
last two columns in Table 4.1). This may indicate that extreme estimates of βx are
rather a failure of the optimization routine than a property of the continuous updating
estimator. Overall, the probability that the optimization converges increases when I
additionally use fixed starting values, and it even reaches 100% in the simulations with
100 or 800 observations. Nevertheless, the variance and in some cases also the mean
are still tremendously high, pointing to the “no-moments problem”.
2 For instance, a user-written command in Stata uses the 2SLS estimates as starting values (see Baum
et al. 2007).
3 The starting value for the constant is set to zero.
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Figure 4.1: Criterion function of the continuous updating estimator with multiple
optima (m = 5, ρ = 0.9, CP = 1, n=25)
Adding fixed starting values appears to affect the median bias as well. It tends to
be larger in the first set of estimates in which the starting values are obtained from
2SLS. This effect is particularly pronounced in the simulations with 25 observations.
But it can also be observed in larger samples given that the identification is extremely
weak. For instance, using Hausman et al. (2011)’s simulation with n = 400, ρ = 0.3,
m = 50 and CP = 8, the median bias is 0.136 with 2SLS starting values and 0.091
with fixed and 2SLS starting values. This result is not reported in the table.
Figure 4.1 suggests a potential reason for the difference in the median bias. It
displays the criterion function of an example data set which has been evaluated for all
values of βx between -2 and 2 using a step size of 0.01.4 In Figure 4.1 you can see a
local minimum which is very close to the 2SLS estimate marked on the upper axis. In
this example the continuous updating estimator ends up in this local minimum when
I use the 2SLS estimate as starting value. Such a situation can be observed very often
when the sample size is small and/or the identification is weak.
I performed an additional Monte Carlo simulation using the simple example dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph to analyze the effect of starting values on the reported
4 Such a brute force approach has also been suggested by Hansen et al. (1996) and Guggenberger (2005,
2008). It finds the true minimizer given that it lies between -2 and 2. However, since this approach is
computationally demanding in higher dimensions, I revert to a model without constant.
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performance of the continuous updating estimator more systematically. Again, the
criterion function has been evaluated using a fine grid with step size of 0.01, but now
for all values of βx in between -5 and 5. Using this range, there was at least one
minimum in almost all simulation replications. The minimum of all these optima is
denoted as global optimum (βglobal).5 All other optima are local (βlocal). The variables
ζ and CSV shall be defined as follows:
ζ = 1
(
|β̂2SLS − βlocal| < |β̂2SLS − βglobal|
)
, (4.17)
CSV = 1
(∣∣∣∣∣ β̂SVCUE − βlocal(β̂SVCUE + βlocal)/2
∣∣∣∣∣ < 0.05
)
(4.18)
where β̂2SLS is the 2SLS estimator and β̂SVCUE denotes the continuous updating estimator
that is supposed to depend on the choice of the starting values (SV ). The first variable,
ζ, is equal to one when β̂2SLS is closer to the local than to the global optimum. The
second variable, CSV , indicates the convergence of the continuous updating estimator
to a local optimum where convergence is assumed if the relative difference between the
continuous updating estimator and the local optimum is smaller than 5%.
Table 4.2 shows the simulation results of the continuous updating estimator for both
sets of starting values, and additionally provides the results from the 2SLS estimator
and the global optimum. Throughout, the presence of local optima decreases with
the sample size and the strength of the identification. Local optima are particularly
likely in simulations with both small sample size and low concentration parameter. For
instance, 44% of the replications exhibit local optima in the simulation with n = 25
and CP = 1. Table 4.2 also shows the fraction of replications in which the continuous
updating estimator converges to a local optimum, i.e. Pr(CSV = 1). Overall, this
probability increases considerably when only 2SLS is used as starting value compared
to using fixed starting values as well (0.253 vs. 0.001 in the example with n = 25 and
CP = 1). This effect is particularly pronounced when the 2SLS estimates are closer
to the local than to the global optimum, i.e. ζ = 1 (0.540 vs. 0.001 in case of n = 25
5 Of course, it is just the global optimum in between -5 and 5.
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and CP = 1). On the other hand, the 2SLS estimates work well when they are nearer
to the global optimum, i.e. ζ = 0 (0.017 vs. 0.001 in the simulation with n = 25 and
CP = 1). While it is not surprising that the continuous updating estimator converges
more likely to a local optimum when the chosen starting values are close to this local
optimum, it is particularly problematic in this case because 2SLS is generally more
biased than the continuous updating estimator. The nearness of the local optimum to
the 2SLS estimate may then suggest that the reported performance of the continuous
updating estimator is affected by the properties of 2SLS.
The last three columns in Table 4.2 support this suggestion. They show the median
bias and the nine decile range for the continuous updating estimator with 2SLS as start-
ing values and, on the other hand, with fixed starting values and 2SLS. Additionally,
I report the global optima from the grid evaluation and the estimates from 2SLS.
The median bias and the nine decile range of the continuous updating estimator turn
out to be almost equally large for both sets of starting values when the continuous
updating estimator with 2SLS starting values does not converge to a local optimum
(C2SLS = 0). On the other hand, they are distinctly different when the continuous up-
dating estimator with 2SLS starting values converges to a local optimum (C2SLS = 1).
As expected, choosing 2SLS as starting values increases the reported bias but, on the
other hand, also decreases the reported dispersion of the continuous updating estima-
tor. The results from the grid evaluation are always very similar to the results from
the continuous updating estimator with fixed starting values. On the contrary, the
continuous updating estimator with 2SLS starting values performs as poor as the 2SLS
estimator given that it converges to a local optimum. This confirms the importance
of trying different starting values not only in real-world data sets but also in Monte
Carlo simulations. The impact of this on the unconditional results depends essentially
on the frequency of local optima. For instance, while a difference in the median bias
can also be observed in larger samples and with stronger identification, this effect does
not change the unconditional median bias since the frequency of local optima is almost
zero in these examples.6
6 This can also be observed in Table 4.1. Note, however, that the estimations in Table 4.1 are not
completely comparable because they include a constant.
Continuously updated GMM 75
Ta
bl
e
4.
2:
C
on
ti
nu
ou
s
up
da
ti
ng
es
ti
m
at
or
(C
U
E
),
st
ar
ti
ng
va
lu
es
an
d
lo
ca
lo
pt
im
a
M
ed
ia
n
bi
as
/n
in
e
de
ci
le
ra
ng
e
P
r(
C
S
V
=
1
)
gi
ve
n
th
e
pr
es
en
ce
of
a
lo
ca
lo
pt
im
um
Lo
ca
lo
pt
im
a∗
gi
ve
n
an
d
gi
ve
n
β̂
SV
C
P
n
0
1
2+
P
r(
ζ
=
1
)
ζ
=
0
ζ
=
1
ov
er
al
l
C
2
S
L
S
=
0
C
2
S
L
S
=
1
ov
er
al
l
2S
LS
–
1
25
0.
52
0
0.
40
7
0.
03
3
0.
45
1
0.
76
5/
0.
74
5
0.
81
6/
0.
58
8
0.
78
1/
0.
70
7
C
U
E
2S
LS
1
25
0.
01
7
0.
54
0
0.
25
3
0.
65
0/
2.
52
8
0.
83
1/
1.
06
5
0.
71
7/
2.
19
8
C
U
E
F
SV
&
2S
LS
1
25
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
64
4/
2.
89
5
0.
28
5/
6.
94
3
0.
61
4/
4.
47
1
G
lo
ba
l
–
1
25
0.
65
0/
2.
81
0
0.
30
0/
6.
83
0
0.
62
0/
4.
35
0
2S
LS
–
1
10
0
0.
83
2
0.
09
4
0.
00
0
0.
47
9
0.
84
8/
0.
42
3
0.
86
7/
0.
33
4
0.
85
4/
0.
39
7
C
U
E
2S
LS
1
10
0
0.
00
7
0.
61
8
0.
30
0
0.
72
8/
1.
95
2
0.
88
3/
0.
84
6
0.
80
4/
1.
63
8
C
U
E
F
SV
&
2S
LS
1
10
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
73
3/
1.
95
9
0.
22
7/
6.
79
0
0.
69
0/
4.
08
0
G
lo
ba
l
–
1
10
0
0.
74
0/
1.
96
0
0.
24
0/
6.
79
0
0.
70
0/
4.
08
0
2S
LS
–
1
80
0
0.
91
0
0.
01
0
0.
00
0
0.
50
0
0.
89
5/
0.
14
9
0.
89
4/
0.
11
5
0.
89
4/
0.
14
2
C
U
E
2S
LS
1
80
0
0.
00
4
0.
66
5
0.
33
5
0.
91
7/
1.
43
5
0.
90
4/
0.
80
9
0.
91
1/
1.
21
2
C
U
E
F
SV
&
2S
LS
1
80
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
91
5/
1.
40
1
0.
25
5/
7.
15
2
0.
85
8/
4.
51
2
G
lo
ba
l
–
1
80
0
0.
92
5/
1.
40
0
0.
26
5/
7.
16
0
0.
87
0/
4.
51
0
2S
LS
–
10
25
0.
61
1
0.
35
2
0.
02
5
0.
31
7
0.
32
2/
0.
65
7
0.
42
1/
0.
58
2
0.
33
6/
0.
66
2
C
U
E
2S
LS
10
25
0.
00
8
0.
40
1
0.
13
3
0.
10
3/
1.
66
5
0.
48
9/
1.
24
7
0.
15
9/
1.
68
9
C
U
E
F
SV
&
2S
LS
10
25
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
09
7/
2.
01
8
-0
.5
03
/6
.5
35
0.
06
7/
2.
93
9
G
lo
ba
l
–
10
25
0.
11
0/
1.
97
0
-0
.4
80
/6
.3
70
0.
08
0/
2.
83
0
2S
LS
–
10
10
0
0.
98
0
0.
01
0
0.
00
0
0.
36
1
0.
48
7/
0.
54
4
0.
65
3/
0.
40
4
0.
50
4/
0.
54
8
C
U
E
2S
LS
10
10
0
0.
00
3
0.
32
1
0.
11
8
0.
10
7/
1.
45
3
0.
76
3/
0.
78
5
0.
15
4/
1.
60
9
C
U
E
F
SV
&
2S
LS
10
10
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
10
7/
1.
44
0
-0
.7
79
/6
.1
06
0.
06
9/
2.
24
3
G
lo
ba
l
–
10
10
0
0.
12
0/
1.
44
0
-0
.7
70
/6
.1
05
0.
08
0/
2.
24
0
C
U
E
2S
LS
10
80
0
0.
99
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
–†
L
in
ea
r
m
od
el
w
it
ho
ut
co
ns
ta
nt
an
d
un
de
r
ho
m
os
ke
da
st
ic
it
y:
m
=
5
;
ρ
=
0
.9
;
N
um
be
r
of
re
pl
ic
at
io
ns
:
50
,0
00
.
In
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
no
n-
co
nv
er
ge
nc
e
is
de
cl
ar
ed
if
50
it
er
at
io
ns
ar
e
re
ac
he
d
w
it
ho
ut
fin
di
ng
a
m
in
im
um
.
L
oc
al
an
d
gl
ob
al
op
ti
m
a
ar
e
ob
ta
in
ed
us
in
g
a
gr
id
ov
er
th
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
sp
ac
e
(f
ro
m
-5
to
5;
st
ep
si
ze
0.
01
).
∗
T
he
di
ffe
re
nc
e
to
1
is
th
e
fr
ac
ti
on
of
re
pl
ic
at
io
ns
in
w
hi
ch
th
er
e
w
as
no
m
in
im
um
be
tw
ee
n
-5
an
d
5.
F
SV
:
F
ix
ed
st
ar
ti
ng
va
lu
es
(-
2,
-1
,0
,1
,2
);
SV
:
st
ar
ti
ng
va
lu
es
.
†
N
o
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.
Continuously updated GMM 76
Using the same line of arguments, it follows that all estimates, which are more biased
than the continuous updating estimator, are generally poor starting values whenever
local optima are present. Han and Phillips (2006), for example, used ordinary least
squares estimates as starting values for the continuous updating estimator in their
simulations. This, although not reported here, do not work either. A generalization
of this approach to a multidimensional parameter space is in principle possible but
cumbersome due to the computational burden.
4.3.3 Median bias and rejection frequencies
Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the simulation results for n = 25, n = 100 and n = 800,
respectively.7 The graphs show the relationships predicted by equations (4.15) and
(4.16). The 2SLS median bias increases with the degree of endogeneity and decreases
with the concentration parameter. Apart from the specifications that are close to the
just-identified case, the median bias is also independent of the number of instruments
as has been shown in equation (4.16). Moreover a comparison of the graphs shows,
as expected, that increasing the sample size does not reduce the median bias of 2SLS
under weak instruments asymptotics. The continuous updating estimator appears to
perform slightly worse in the tiny sample with just 25 observations (Figure 4.2) than in
Figure 4.3, where the sample size is 100, and Figure 4.4, where the sample size is 800.
However, it clearly outperforms 2SLS and JIVE2 once the sample size is reasonably
large (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4).
According to the simulation with the largest sample size, the continuous updating
estimator is almost median unbiased and this result is, interestingly, independent of
the degree of endogeneity. Obviously, the bias increases in the neighborhood of an
unidentified model where the instruments are completely uninformative. Nevertheless,
the continuous updating estimator becomes median unbiased once the concentration
parameter is around 5 which implies a population first stage F -statistic of around 1.
This is considerably lower than the rule of thumb for 2SLS, which is around 10.
This result is consistent with recent Monte Carlo results of Hansen et al. (2008).
7 The continuous updating estimator has been estimated with different starting values (-2,-1,0,1,2) to
prevent convergence problems and local optima.
Continuously updated GMM 77
They found that the use of LIML, which matches the continuous updating estimator
in the case of a linear model and homoskedasticity (see e.g. Hausman et al., 2011 and
Guggenberger, 2005, 2008), is often adequate in situations where the F -statistic takes
on values around one. For instance, in their simulation LIML is almost unbiased with
ρ = 0.8, m = 8 and CP = 8.
While the continuous updating estimator is less median biased than 2SLS and
JIVE2 in almost all situations, the rejection frequencies for H0 : βx = 0 with the usual
standard errors (CUE) are far too high especially in small samples. In contrast to this,
the rejection frequencies with the new variance estimator (CUEC) proposed by Newey
and Windmeijer (2009) are often very close to the nominal level once the sample size
is reasonably large.
According to Figures 4.3 and 4.4, the rejection frequency of 2SLS increases con-
stantly with rising number of instruments although the sets of instruments are equally
strong. This has already been shown in Staiger and Stock (1997)’s figure 3. The
rejection frequency of the continuous updating estimator based on the new variance
estimator is, however, close to the nominal size and independent of the number of
instruments once the number of instruments is larger than 4. It performs also better
than the continuous updating estimator with usual standard errors especially when the
sample size is 100. Furthermore, it depends only slightly on the degree of endogeneity
and is nearly level-correct for all values of the concentration parameter apart from
situations in which the model is almost unidentified.
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Figure 4.2: Median bias and rejection frequencies when n = 25
(Step size: ρ = 0.02, CP = 2, m = 1; 10,000 replications each)
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Figure 4.3: Median bias and rejection frequencies when n = 100
(Step size: ρ = 0.02, CP = 2, m = 1; 10,000 replications each)
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Figure 4.4: Median bias and rejection frequencies when n = 800
(Step size: ρ = 0.02, CP = 2, m = 1; 10,000 replications each)
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So far, the degree of endogeneity has been fixed at a very high level to evaluate
the performance of Newey and Windmeijer’s variance estimator under extreme con-
ditions. Based on a literature review, Hansen et al. (2008) argue that values of
ρ ≥ 0.8 may not be very relevant for practice. In the following, I set ρ = 0.3 which is,
according to Hansen et al. (2008)’s literature review, a more realistic value. Following
Chamberlain and Imbens (2004), I also add an additional element to the Monte Carlo
design that makes the simulations more comparable to the situation in Angrist and
Krueger (1991)’s data set. Chamberlain and Imbens (2004) divide the set of instru-
ments into a small set of basic instrumental variables and a set of doubtful instrumental
variables. Using Angrist and Krueger (1991)’s application, they argue that the basic
variation stems from the quarter-of-birth dummies, while the quarter-of-birth inter-
actions are the doubtful set of instruments. In the following, I also split the set of
instruments into two subsets. The first set contains a fixed number of relevant in-
struments (m1) while the second set of instruments is completely irrelevant (m2). In
Figures 4.5 to 4.7 the number of irrelevant instruments is 0, 2 and 6, respectively,
while the concentration parameter has been fixed at six different values. Hence, the
population first stage F -statistic decreases from Figures 4.5 to 4.7, which is similar
to the application discussed in the next section. Once the doubtful quarter-of-birth
interactions are included, the first stage F -statistic decreases considerably.
In this simulation design the performance of 2SLS is extremely poor because not
only the bias increases with the number of instruments but also the rejection frequency,
given a constant bias, increases with the number of instruments (see e.g. Figure 4.4).
Therefore I only discuss the results from the continuous updating estimator in the
following. Without including the irrelevant instruments (see Figure 4.5), the divergence
between t-statistics based on the usual standard errors and NW’s standard errors does
not seem to be great. While both densities appear to be non-normal for low values
of the concentration parameter, they converge to a normal distribution as the concen-
tration parameter increases. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show that the inclusion of irrelevant
instruments affects especially the t-statistics based on the usual standard errors. The
density becomes even bimodal for low values of the concentration parameter. However,
the performance of t-statistics based on the new variance estimator stays almost iden-
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Figure 4.5: Simulation densities of t-statistics when n = 100
(ρ = 0.3, m1 = 2, m2 = 0; 10,000 replications each). Dashed lines show CUEC;
longer dashes show CUE; solid lines show standard normal distributions.
tical as the number of irrelevant instruments increases. For instance, with 6 irrelevant
instruments and a concentration parameter of 16, the density of the CUEC is almost
normal. Throughout, whenever the performance of both variance estimators is poor,
the actual size of the test seems to be slightly higher for positive estimates than for
negative ones. This pattern is the other way round when the correlation is negative.
The corresponding graph for m2 = 6 is displayed in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 4.6: Simulation densities of t-statistics when n = 100
(ρ = 0.3, m1 = 2, m2 = 2; 10,000 replications each). Dashed lines show CUEC;
longer dashes show CUE; solid lines show standard normal distributions.
4.4 Application†
Angrist and Krueger (1991) estimated the effect of schooling on income using a sample
of 329,500 men born 1930-39 from the 1980 census. This sample has been extensively
used as an application in the weak instruments literature. Using randomly generated
indicators for quarter of birth, Bound et al. (1995), for instance, showed that 2SLS
suffer from finite-sample bias even if the sample size is as large as in Angrist and
Krueger’s sample. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggested that LIML point estimates are
† Following the results from the previous section, I tried different starting values for the
education parameter in all regression specifications where the identification was particularly weak
(F -statistic<1.5). The 2SLS starting values, however, performed well in this application.
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Figure 4.7: Simulation densities of t-statistics when n = 100
(ρ = 0.3, m1 = 2, m2 = 6; 10,000 replications each). Dashed lines show CUEC;
longer dashes show CUE; solid lines show standard normal distributions.
more reliable in situations where the first-stage F -statistic is small. However, they also
showed that the coverage rate of LIML using the conventional standard errors might be
too low in case of weak instruments. Almost a decade later, Cruz and Moreira (2005)
picked up this issue and calculated LIML confidence intervals for this application that
are based on a conditional likelihood test. Moreira (2003) showed that confidence
regions based on this test have correct coverage probability even when identification is
weak. Chamberlain and Imbens (2004) proposed a new estimator which also performs
better in terms of coverage rate and employed this estimator to the Angrist and Krueger
(1991) data set. In both studies the usual standard errors of LIML turned out to be
too small. I therefore report sandwich-type standard errors which lead to the same
test decisions as in Cruz and Moreira (2005).
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While the LIML estimator is more reliable than 2SLS, it is not robust against certain
types of heteroskedasticity (see e.g. Bekker and van der Ploeg, 2005 and Hausman
et al., 2007). The contribution of the present study is to analyze the Angrist and
Krueger (1991) data set using an estimator that is robust to both heteroskedasticity
and weak identification. The presence of heteroskedasticity in the wage equation is
not unlikely. Klein and Vella (2009), for instance, discussed some potential sources of
heteroskedasticity. However, the extent to which heteroskedasticity affects the point
estimates of returns to education is an empirical question.
The aim of Angrist and Krueger (1991) is to estimate the causal effect of compulsory
schooling on earnings using the variation that quarter of birth induces in school atten-
dance. An increasing number of studies argues that this variation is not, or at least
not completely, exogenous. Such a conclusion would preclude a causal interpretation
of the results. For instance, in a very early study, Bound et al. (1995) discussed poten-
tial channels of a direct effect of quarter of birth on wages. They concluded that the
existence of such a direct effect is quite plausible. Bound and Jaeger (2000) renewed
their concerns some years later. More recently, Buckles and Hungerman (2008) showed
that mothers’ socioeconomic characteristics vary depending on season of birth. These
characteristics can explain a considerable fraction of the relationship between quarter
of birth and schooling which indicates that the variation in quarter of birth is at least
not completely exogenous. Buckles and Hungerman (2008) also noted that control-
ling for family background characteristics might not be enough to produce consistent
estimates since there could still be a correlation between season of birth and the unob-
servables in the model. Following the literature about weak instruments, I nevertheless
use this application to illustrate the performance of Newey and Windmeijer (2009)’s
new variance estimator.
I re-estimate the model in the second column of Angrist and Krueger (1991)’s
table V for 100 random subsamples using the continuous updating estimator. Each
subsample contains around 30% of the dataset. Table 4.3 shows the median and the
standard deviation of the estimated coefficients and the corresponding Wald statis-
tics for 2SLS, JIVE2 and the continuous updating estimator with the usual and the
new variance estimator. The effect of education is slightly stronger when I use the
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Table 4.3: Estimates of returns to education from 100 random subsamples
# IVs State effects Year effects Coeff. 2SLS JIVE2 CUE CUEC
30 No Yes Effect size 0.082 0.100 0.092 0.092
(0.022) (0.202) (0.041) (0.041)
Wald statistic 11.90 2.490 15.37 4.865
(5.814) (2.467) (9.762) (4.320)
Median (Standard deviation); Wald test of H0 : no returns to education (χ21-distributed).
continuous updating estimator compared with 2SLS. It is even somewhat stronger
when I use JIVE2. The JIVE2 estimates are much more dispersed than the estimates
from the continuous updating estimator. While the usual variance estimator of the
continuous updating estimator leads to even larger Wald statistics than 2SLS, the
corrected variance estimator gives distinctly lower Wald statistics. JIVE2 is more con-
servative than Newey and Windmeijer’s corrected variance estimator in this regression
specification. Nakov (2010) also used this data set from which he drew 100 random
subsamples with 50,000 observations in each. He reported the estimates for JIVE1 and
JIVE2. While the median of the effect size is very similar to his findings, the standard
deviation is distinctly lower in my simulation. The smaller standard deviation is, how-
ever, in line with Davidson and MacKinnon (2006). Although they found that JIVE1
is more dispersed than 2SLS, the differences are quite modest in large samples.
Table 4.4 shows the results using the full sample of men born 1930-39. I use the same
four regression specifications as Angrist and Krueger (1991) in their table V and table
VII (column 7 and 8). Additionally, I estimate the specification proposed by Bound
et al. (1995). They included only three indicator variables for quarter of birth, which
is the basic source of exogenous variation. The first-stage F -statistic is 13.5 in this
regression specification and thus above the rule of thumb for 2SLS. Not surprisingly,
the estimates of the returns to education in the first column of Table 4.4 are very similar
for 2SLS, LIML and the continuous updating estimator. The many weak instruments
standard errors are also very close to the usual standard errors. The number of excluded
instruments is distinctly larger in Angrist and Krueger (1991)’s specification. The
instruments in column 2 to 5 of Table 4.4 are obtained by interacting quarter of birth
with 9 year of birth indicators. The instruments in the last column are obtained by
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interacting quarter of birth with 9 year of birth and 50 state of birth indicators. The
first-stage F -statistic reported for these five specifications is now distinctly lower which
might bias the 2SLS estimator towards the OLS estimator (see e.g. Bound et al., 1995
and Staiger and Stock, 1997). Staiger and Stock (1997) also show that this bias is less
of a problem for LIML than 2SLS.
The point estimates of the continuous updating estimator are always close to the
LIML estimates. This is also the case for the many weak instruments standard errors
Table 4.4: Returns to education on men’s log weekly earnings (born 1930-1939)
BJB AK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.063 0.071 0.071 0.063 0.063 0.063
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2SLS 0.142 0.089 0.076 0.081 0.060 0.081
(0.033) (0.016) (0.029) (0.016) (0.029) (0.011)
LIML 0.146 0.093 0.081 0.084 0.057 0.098
(0.035) (0.020) (0.060) (0.020) (0.052) (0.022)
JIVE2 0.202 0.096 0.116 0.090 0.086 0.144
(0.066) (0.022) (0.266) (0.026) (0.211) (0.052)
CUE 0.146 0.095 0.085 0.086 0.061 0.102
usual SE (0.033) (0.016) (0.029) (0.017) (0.029) (0.011)
many weak instruments SE (0.035) (0.020) (0.058) (0.020) (0.050) (0.022)
Excluded instruments:
Quarter of birth × × × × × ×
Quarter of birth × year of birth × × × × ×
Quarter of birth × state of birth ×
Number of excluded instruments 3 30 28 30 28 178
F (excluded instruments) 13.5 4.80 1.42 4.62 1.40 1.78
Control variables:
Age, Age2 × × × ×
Race, SMSA, married × × × ×
9 Year-of-birth dummies × × × × ×
8 Region-of-residence dummies × × × ×
50 State-of-birth dummies ×
Number of observations: 329,509. Robust SE in parentheses.
BJB: Bound et al. (1995)’s regression specification; AK: Angrist and Krueger (1991)’s regression specification.
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and the standard errors of LIML. Figure 4.4 from the simulation results shows that
the difference between the usual and NW’s standard errors is inversely related to the
strength of the instruments. This pattern can also be observed in the real data set.
While the relative difference is around 6% in Bound et al. (1995)’s specification, it is
up to 100% in the other specifications where the first-stage F -statistic is considerably
lower.8
4.5 Conclusion
This study analyzes the finite-sample properties of the continuous updating estimator.
While it is well-known that trying different starting values is necessary to obtain the
global minimum of the criterion function of the continuous updating estimator, it is
interesting to see that this can also affect its reported performance in Monte Carlo
simulations. To put it the other way around, choosing the two-stage least squares
estimates as starting values turns out to be a poor choice, especially when the sample
size is small and/or the identification is weak. A potential reason for this is the likely
presence of local optima and the fact that the continuous updating estimator often
converges to these local optima if they are close to the 2SLS estimates. In these
cases the continuous updating estimator seems to be distinctly more biased and less
dispersed. This study also shows that extreme estimates of the continuous updating
estimator, which are often reported in Monte Carlo simulations, are more likely to
be a failure of the optimization routine than a property of the continuous updating
estimator.
The continuous updating estimator becomes almost median unbiased in my
simulation design once the population first stage F -statistic is around 1. This is con-
siderably lower than the rule of thumb for 2SLS, which is around 10. The median bias
appears to be independent of the degree of endogeneity. Throughout, the continuous
updating estimator outperforms 2SLS and JIVE2 once the sample size is reasonably
large. However, the rejection frequencies with the usual standard errors are far too
8 This pattern can also be observed in the 1920-29 cohort and in the 1940-49 cohort. The corresponding
results are reported in Appendix A.3 and A.4.
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high especially in small samples. In contrast to this, the rejection frequencies with
the new variance estimator proposed by Newey and Windmeijer (2009) are often very
close to the nominal level once the sample size is reasonably large. Additionally, the
new variance estimator depends only slightly on the inclusion of irrelevant instruments.
This property makes it particularly attractive for the analysis of Angrist and Krueger
(1991)’s regression specifications in which a large set of quarter-of-birth interactions
weakens the identification.
Appendices
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A.1 Narrow replication of NW (2009)
Table 4.5: Median bias and rejection frequencies
CP=10 CP=20 CP=35
Bias RF Bias RF Bias RF
ρ = 0.3
m=3
2SLS 0.0507 0.0447 0.0267 0.0474 0.0140 0.0503
JIVE2 -0.0366 0.0208 -0.0388 0.0289 -0.0216 0.0388
CUEC 0.0050 0.0376 0.0016 0.0407 0.0020 0.0436
m=15
2SLS 0.1796 0.1622 0.1291 0.1333 0.0894 0.1112
JIVE2 0.0615 0.0167 -0.0160 0.0236 -0.0161 0.0334
CUEC 0.0328 0.0746 0.0052 0.0642 0.0020 0.0554
ρ = 0.5
m=3
2SLS 0.0871 0.0820 0.0444 0.0722 0.0253 0.0636
JIVE2 -0.0695 0.0368 -0.0591 0.0339 -0.0332 0.0389
CUEC 0.0034 0.0533 0.0016 0.0469 0.0017 0.0465
m=15
2SLS 0.2983 0.4022 0.2125 0.3039 0.1483 0.2254
JIVE2 0.0870 0.0438 -0.0279 0.0376 -0.0270 0.0373
CUEC 0.0475 0.1018 0.0069 0.0737 -0.0005 0.0546
ρ = 0.9
m=3
2SLS 0.1589 0.1908 0.0825 0.1323 0.0479 0.0993
JIVE2 -0.1354 0.0679 -0.1007 0.0439 -0.0569 0.0394
CUEC 0.0029 0.0767 0.0022 0.0624 0.0015 0.0548
m=15
2SLS 0.5356 0.9343 0.3801 0.7988 0.2644 0.6255
JIVE2 0.0861 0.1405 -0.0586 0.0778 -0.0447 0.0615
CUEC 0.0149 0.0955 0.0022 0.0685 0.0006 0.0555
n = 200; α = βx = 0; 10,000 replications.
Rejection frequencies for H0 : βx = 0 using Wald tests.
The results for JIVE2 are not comparable since Newey and Windmeijer
have estimated a generalization of JIVE2.
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A.2 Simulation densities of t-statistics when ρ < 0
Figure 4.8: Simulation densities of t-statistics when ρ is negative (ρ = −0.3,
m1 = 2, m2 = 6, n = 100; 10,000 replications each). Dashed lines show CUEC;
longer dashes show CUE; solid lines show standard normal distributions.
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A.3 Returns to education (men born 1920-1929)
Table 4.6: Returns to education on men’s log weekly earnings (born 1920-1929)
BJB AK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.070 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.070 0.069
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2SLS 0.056 0.077 0.131 0.067 0.101 0.089
(0.021) (0.015) (0.034) (0.015) (0.034) (0.011)
LIML 0.055 0.076 0.255 0.066 0.282 0.131
(0.021) (0.020) (0.156) (0.020) (0.357) (0.037)
JIVE2 0.051 0.076 -0.081 0.065 0.032 0.481
(0.027) (0.021) (0.137) (0.024) (0.042) (0.638)
CUE 0.056 0.075 0.257 0.065 0.286 –†
usual SE (0.021) (0.015) (0.045) (0.015) (0.052)
many weak instruments SE (0.021) (0.021) (0.124) (0.020) (0.242)
Excluded instruments:
Quarter of birth × × × × × ×
Quarter of birth × year of birth × × × × ×
Quarter of birth × state of birth ×
Number of excluded instruments 3 30 28 30 28 176
F (excluded instruments) 24.7 4.60 1.17 4.57 1.12 1.51
Control variables:
Age, Age2 × × × ×
Race, SMSA, married × × × ×
9 Year-of-birth dummies × × × × ×
8 Region-of-residence dummies × × × ×
50 State-of-birth dummies ×
Number of observations: 247,199. Robust SE in parentheses. † Estimation did not converge.
BJB: Bound et al. (1995)’s regression specification; AK: Angrist and Krueger (1991)’s regression specification.
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A.4 Returns to education (men born 1940-1949)
Table 4.7: Returns to education on men’s log weekly earnings (born 1940-1949)
BJB AK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.052 0.057 0.057 0.052 0.052 0.052
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2SLS 0.201 0.055 0.095 0.039 0.078 0.067
(0.059) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.024) (0.011)
LIML 0.293 0.054 0.137 0.029 0.124 0.088
(0.119) (0.025) (0.049) (0.027) (0.070) (0.028)
JIVE2 1.623 0.055 0.124 0.035 0.128 0.117
(3.888) (0.017) (0.042) (0.019) (0.077) (0.048)
CUE 0.293 0.055 0.140 0.030 0.129 0.090
usual SE (0.073) (0.014) (0.023) (0.015) (0.025) (0.011)
many weak instruments SE (0.105) (0.025) (0.049) (0.027) (0.067) (0.029)
Excluded instruments:
Quarter of birth × × × × × ×
Quarter of birth × year of birth × × × × ×
Quarter of birth × state of birth ×
Number of excluded instruments 3 30 28 30 28 178
F (excluded instruments) 6.25 7.27 3.27 6.54 2.71 1.93
Control variables:
Age, Age2 × × × ×
Race, SMSA, married × × × ×
9 Year-of-birth dummies × × × × ×
8 Region-of-residence dummies × × × ×
50 State-of-birth dummies ×
Number of observations: 486,926. Robust SE in parentheses.
BJB: Bound et al. (1995)’s regression specification; AK: Angrist and Krueger (1991)’s regression specification.
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